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executive summary
The report presents evidence of improvements in public 
sector accounting systems, with the consolidation process 
required by WGA acting as a catalyst, stimulating change 
at the departmental level – particularly in terms of the 
collection and recording of financial data. What impact this 
has had in terms of improved governmental decision 
making, however, is an open question, the answer to which 
depends upon the long-term practical operation of WGA 
systems. 
The research findings lead to the conclusion that WGA 
appears to have been a tool to instill the discipline of 
accounting across the public sector, rather than its 
supposed role of improving macroeconomic management 
and governmental accountability processes. 
The deadlines for the publication of WGA have been 
extended on a number of occasions (no full WGA accounts 
have yet been published by the UK government), thus 
there are limits to the assessment of the practical 
outcomes of WGA. Nevertheless, the planned scale of the 
project (it is said to be the biggest ever governmental 
accounting consolidation project), the major claims that 
have been (and continue to be) made for it and the 
continuing delay over full implementation certainly warrant 
the type of independent review and analysis provided here. 
Ten years after the initial official governmental study first 
advocated WGA, this report offers a thorough and timely 
insight into such a ‘grand design’ project. The findings are 
of both national and international relevance. Certainly it 
would be prudent for countries considering the 
implementation of similar consolidated public sector 
accounting systems to ensure that they have absorbed the 
lessons from the experiences of ‘pioneer’ countries, and 
given careful consideration to the relative costs, benefits 
and practical achievements of such reforms.
The UK government made a committment to produce a 
consolidated set of public sector accruals-based accounts, 
known as Whole of Government Accounts (WGA), as a 
component of its accounting reforms, eg Resource 
Accounting and Budgeting (RAB). This requirement was 
mandated by the Government Resources and Accounts Act 
(2000).
The government has claimed that WGA is needed for the 
following reasons: (1) to assist in macroeconomic and 
fiscal planning; (2) to achieve greater accountability and 
transparency of public finances; and (3) to provide 
widespread improvement in accounting information 
systems across the public sector. This report documents 
the history and development of WGA and considers the 
degree of progress to date in realising the claims made for 
such a consolidated public sector accounting system. 
In assessing the role of WGA in macroeconomic and fiscal 
planning, the report highlights a number of compatibility 
issues arising from the use of GAAP as the underlying 
accounting basis. It also examines the motives behind the 
tradition of using (consolidated) accounting in the private 
sector in order not only to assess the practical capacity of 
an accruals-based WGA but also to identify the likely users 
of WGA accounting information.
Concerning the claim that WGA will improve accountability 
of public sector finances through greater accounting 
transparency, the report points to a number of unresolved 
problems, including inconsistencies in accounting for 
certain public sector assets and liabilities and debates over 
the limits of the WGA consolidation boundary. The report 
also shows that a number of these issues have also proved 
problematic in other countries more experienced in WGA, 
such as Australia and New Zealand, raising questions 
about how much has been learned at the international 
level in this area of development and reform.
6the Aims of the reseArch
This report examines the pursuit and implementation, to 
date, of Whole of Government Accounting (WGA) in the UK. 
This study was designed with the following four aims.
To provide a detailed account of WGA’s historical •	
development, studying the way in which WGA was 
initiated, promoted, debated and approved. 
To consider the main factors driving the development •	
and implementation of WGA and the key shifts that 
have taken place over the relevant period. 
To elicit and explore the personal experiences of key •	
actors and stakeholders involved with the WGA project.
To review, on the basis of experiences to date, the •	
extent to which the claims for WGA are justified, 
identifying key benefits secured, problems overcome 
and hurdles still to be surmounted.
Overall, the report is intended to raise awareness about a 
project that can appear to be rather technical but that, on 
closer inspection, has fundamental implications for the 
way in which we think about government and how we 
account for and monitor its performance and that of other 
public sector institutions. By drawing on the views of a 
range of governmental officers, political representatives, 
audit bodies and other key stakeholders (eg professional 
accounting bodies and academics), the research provides 
an informed assessment of the development process 
associated with the pursuit of WGA. We hope the study will 
be useful to those with an interest in governmental 
accountability, including those who do not necessarily have 
the accounting skills to be able to understand properly the 
significance of the WGA project. An important dimension 
of the study is that it identifies and seeks to coordinate the 
various views that public sector accountants and Treasury 
officials have of the WGA project and its implementation. 
WGA is capable of affecting the role and reputation of both 
public sector accounting systems and public sector 
accountants. Accordingly, it is essential to explore the 
views and experiences of those who have worked most 
closely with WGA, particularly in terms of the key factors to 
influence its operational development and the extent to 
which it is enhancing the quality of governmental 
accounting systems. Indeed, in this respect, it is worth 
noting that some earlier academic accounting research on 
the UK public sector has shown accountants to be more 
sceptical of the need for, and value of, accounting-based 
reforms than the politicians and managers who promote 
them (Bogt and Helden 2000). 
Above all, we hope that the report will contribute to debate, 
both nationally and internationally, on WGA initiatives and 
the changing nature of governmental accounting more 
generally. In particular, it should serve to emphasise the 
importance of keeping the Treasury’s cost-benefit 
assessments of WGA, and continuing WGA development 
processes, under suitably close scrutiny. 
reseArch ApproAch
The first stage of our research focused on the development 
of the Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000 
(GRAA) and the legislative approval duly given to the WGA 
project. This stage of the research involved a broad-based 
literature review, analysing a range of documentary 
material, including relevant parliamentary papers and 
associated parliamentary minutes, academic and 
professional literature, and newspaper commentaries. 
The second stage of the research sought to explore the 
practical development of WGA, to consider its degree of 
progress in terms of meeting its stated aims and to gain 
insights into the changing role of, or broader implications 
for, public sector accounting. The research work included 
analysing key parliamentary documents and relevant 
reports from government departments and professional 
accounting bodies, and conducting a series of semi-
structured interviews with individuals involved with the 
WGA project. These individuals were drawn from the UK, 
Australian and New Zealand Treasuries, UK representatives 
from Parliament, the Office for National Statistics (UK), the 
National Audit Office (UK), local governments (UK) and the 
Financial Reporting Advisory Board (FRAB). 
report strUctUre
The remainder of the report is presented in four chapters. 
Chapter 2 outlines the history of WGA, focusing on the 
claims made for it and the parliamentary debates that led 
to its becoming mandated. Chapter 3 describes the 
development and implementation of WGA. In Chapter 4 we 
assess the UK WGA experience in light of the government’s 
claims for it. Chapter 5 concludes the report and considers 
its research and policy implications. 
1. introduction 
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introdUction
In the past decade or so, there has been significant 
promotion of accruals accounting and budgeting across 
the UK public sector. Although certain parts of the public 
sector have been using accruals accounting for longer 
periods (eg local government and the National Health 
Service), the adoption of accruals accounting became 
widespread only when the government rolled out Resource 
Accounting and Budgeting (RAB) systems across all 
central government bodies. The RAB reforms were closely 
followed by the WGA programme, which sought to develop 
RAB further by generating a consolidated set of accruals-
based accounts for the public sector as a whole. The 
Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000 (GRAA) 
duly mandated that the government report on both a RAB 
and a WGA basis.
The government’s claims for WGA have three elements. 
The first relates to claims of improved decision making, 
especially at the macroeconomic level, whereby WGA is 
said to enhance policy making primarily through the 
provision of better quality information and more joined-up 
reporting. The second element promises increased 
accountability to Parliament and the public, through the 
production, for the first time, of an audited balance sheet 
of the government’s assets and liabilities. The third 
element concerns the anticipated benefits that the 
discipline of having to produce consolidated public sector 
accounts would bring to the reliability, timeliness and 
usefulness of the individual accounting systems of the 
various public sector bodies participating in the WGA 
consolidation process.
These themes are well illustrated by the following extracts, 
the first three of which are taken from the WGA website 
(HM Treasury 2006c) and the final one from the most 
recent Treasury report about WGA.
WGA – Improving government information through joined-
up reporting.
WGA will provide better quality and more transparent 
information to assist with the development of fiscal policy, 
to facilitate better management of public services and to 
assist with the more effective distribution of resources. In 
particular, WGA will provide audited data to underpin the 
operation of the Golden Rule, and allow the public sector 
balance sheet to be used in fiscal management. Preparing 
WGA will meet the commitment in the Code for Fiscal 
Stability to produce accounts for the whole public sector 
on a consolidated basis.
The overview of the public sector finances provided by 
WGA will also improve government’s accountability to 
parliament and taxpayers, and form an important element 
in the Modernising Government agenda.
Amongst the benefits from the WGA programme are: 
Additional impetus to improvements in the quality and 
timeliness of individual body accounts and to financial 
management systems. (HM Treasury 2005b: para. 6.4)
the inception of WGA in the UK
The idea of WGA is not new, having been pioneered in New 
Zealand and Australia. In New Zealand, a WGA for central 
government was published in 1992, while the Australian 
Commonwealth (ie federal) government first trialled WGA 
for the 1994/5 financial period – Funnell and Cooper 
(1998) note that the state of New South Wales published a 
state-based WGA as early as 1989. In both New Zealand 
and Australia, the publication of WGA was preceded by the 
move from a cash to an accruals basis for governmental 
financial reporting. 
In the mid-1990s, the UK’s Conservative government 
formally proposed that central government financial 
reporting and budgeting should change from a cash to an 
accruals basis. These proposals and the associated 
benefits of RAB were published in a parliamentary green 
paper (HM Treasury 1994). The green paper also 
considered developing a set of whole of central 
government accounts (CGA) but rejected it on the grounds 
that it would be of little value, given the differences 
between the various government departments and other 
bodies that would have to be consolidated (HM Treasury 
1994: para. 2.24). The government also argued that the 
consolidation would not produce a meaningful accounting 
entity, in the sense that ‘it would not represent any of the 
“usual bases” for describing governmental activity’ (HM 
Treasury 1994: para. 2.26). It was only after pressure from 
Parliament that HM Treasury agreed to review its initial 
objections (HM Treasury 1995: paras 3.10 and 4.14; C&AG 
1995: para. 33), although no further action was taken until 
the change of government following the May 1997 general 
elections (Chow et al. 2007). 
As part of its economic reform programme, the new 
Labour government announced in its Economic Fiscal 
Strategy Report (EFSR – see HM Treasury 1998a) that it 
would consider producing WGA to enhance both RAB and 
economic policy making, subject to the results of a 
feasibility study. These results were published in the form 
of a WGA ‘scoping study’ (HM Treasury 1998c). The 
scoping study investigated the practicalities of producing 
WGA and estimated such costs to be an ‘affordable’ sum 
of around £1m–£2m per annum. In addition, the scoping 
study considered other practical and conceptual issues 
such as determining the key users of WGA, the usefulness 
of WGA information for economic and accountability 
purposes as compared with statistics-based National 
Accounts, the choice of accounting policies to adopt and 
modify, and consolidation boundaries. The scoping study 
also reported on HM Treasury’s consultations with experts 
and other national governments (in countries such as New 
Zealand, Australia, the US, Sweden and Japan). 
The government did not give any specific rationales in the 
scoping study as to why WGA was better than the existing, 
statistically based, National Accounts, except to say that 
cash-based expenditure information would be replaced by 
an accruals-based system, and that a GAAP-based system 
would generate additional information regarding unfunded 
pension liabilities and asset depreciation charges (HM 
2. introducing WGA
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however, conclude that the benefits from producing WGA 
would outweigh its costs. It recommended that the 
government should first develop a whole of central 
government accounts (CGA), which would consolidate the 
resource accounts of central government departments. On 
completion of CGA, the scoping study recommended that 
it be extended to WGA (representing a consolidation of 
CGA with the accounts of local government and public 
corporations). This staged approach was intended to 
provide a transitional period to deal with any unresolved 
issues. These proposals (along with the move from cash 
accounting to RAB in central government) were 
subsequently debated in Parliament during the passage of 
the Government Resources and Accounts Bill (GRAB 1999) 
in the 1999/2000 Parliamentary sessions. 
pArliAmentAry debAtes
The GRAB 1999 was proposed as a significant amendment 
to the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act of 1866, 
which mandated government to keep cash-based records 
of its receipts and payments. The GRAB 1999 was debated 
in both Houses of Parliament.
In the House of Commons, the government proclaimed the 
benefits of WGA and explained how it would link to the 
government’s economic reform policies, such as the 1998 
Code for Fiscal Stability. 
In the longer term, our aim is for resource accounting and 
budgeting to lead to whole of Government accounts, 
which are the natural next step. That will enable us to 
fulfil the commitment given in the code for fiscal stability 
to produce accounts for the whole public sector on a 
consolidated basis, if possible. (Andrew Smith, Chief 
Secretary to the Treasury, Labour MP, Hansard 
Debates, 6 December 1999, Col. 576, 4.19pm)
Audited WGA will improve the information available and 
support the conduct and monitoring of fiscal policy. The 
accounts will also improve accountability to Parliament 
and provide greater transparency for taxpayers… WGA 
will be an important extension of resource accounting 
and will provide Parliament with an overview of public 
finances, which it has never had before. (Melanie 
Johnson, Economic Secretary to the Labour 
Government, House of Commons Standing Committee 
A, Government Resources and Accounts Bill, 20 
January 2000, 10.30am)
These claims were also repeated in the House of Lords, 
where the government’s Deputy Chief Whip proclaimed that: 
In the longer term, our aim is for resource accounting and 
budgeting to lead to ‘whole of government accounts’ 
(WGA), which is the natural next step. Whole of 
government accounts will fulfil the commitment given in 
the code for fiscal stability to produce accounts for the 
whole public sector on a consolidated basis if possible. 
Audited WGA will improve the information available to 
support the conduct and monitoring of fiscal policy. The 
accounts will also improve accountability to Parliament 
and provide greater transparency for taxpayers. (Lord 
McIntosh of Haringey, Lords Hansard, 10 April 2000, 
Col. 13, 3.08pm)
Opposition MPs in the House of Commons voiced their 
concerns over issues such as the proposed consolidation 
boundary, the reporting of liabilities on the WGA balance 
sheet and the scope of the powers of the Comptroller and 
Auditor General (C&AG) to access and scrutinise bodies 
included in the WGA consolidation. 
In clauses 10 to 11, we shall address the fact that the 
Treasury has ignored the C&AG’s views of the powers that 
he needs to audit the WGA. [5pm, 18 January, 2000]…It 
is the C&AG’s opinion that, under the accounting 
standards under which he is required to work, he has 
access to the subordinate accounts and the right to 
intervene or to require intervention from the subordinate 
auditors of the components of WGA. If he is not able to 
have that access, he may have to qualify WGA on those 
grounds. That is in nobody’s interest. (David Davis, 
Conservative MP, 29 February 2000, Col. 323, 2.30am) 
If resource accounting takes the ultimate form of a 
consolidated balance sheet for the whole of Government, 
can my Hon. Friend imagine what the notes to the 
balance sheet would look like with all the contingent 
liabilities that he has just described? Is it not vital that the 
C&AG has access to every aspect of the spending of 
taxpayers’ money – particularly in respect of contingent 
liabilities? (Charles Wardle, former Independent MP, 29 
February 2000, Col. 264, 10.45am) 
We are talking about whether the public sector pension 
funds – unfunded liabilities – are to be recognised as 
liabilities…We are talking about whether the PFI [private 
finance initiative] liabilities are to be on the balance 
sheet as liabilities...A question arises that is deeply 
material to public policy and to the whole structure of 
accounting: should disability benefits, in some form, be 
on the liabilities side of the WGA, or should they not? 
That is an enormous potential sum. (Oliver Letwin, 
Conservative MP, 29 February 2000, Col. 221, 7.45pm)
Such views were reiterated in the House of Lords by 
Conservative members, as reflected in the following 
comment by Viscount Bridgeman.
With a broad brush, perhaps I may summarise our three 
concerns. First, the Bill gives the Treasury enormous 
powers to determine what is or is not to be included in 
the accounts. Secondly, it establishes no clear principles 
for the accounting of income and expenditure. Thirdly, it 
continues to permit the Treasury to omit large public assets 
and liabilities from the national balance sheet...In particular, 
the state pension liabilities are omitted from the accounts. 
There is nothing to prevent any government from re-
classifying expenditure...we continue to be concerned 
about the vagueness of the Bill in valuing the assets of 
the Ministry of Defence and the definition of private/
public partnership. (Col. 48, 10 April 2000, 5.23pm)
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Despite expressions of concern with respect to the access 
rights of the C&AG, and degrees of freedom given to HM 
Treasury in the determination of accounting policies and 
the bodies to be included in the WGA consolidation, overall 
there was a considerable degree of cross-party 
parliamentary agreement that WGA was an essential part 
of the proposed accounting reforms. 
The substantive point…is that clause 10 [of the GRAB 
1999] allows the Government to stage the preparation of 
the whole of Government accounts, which we think is 
sensible and a proper and appropriate route. (David 
Davis, Conservative MP, Standing Committee A, 
20 January 2000, 10.45am)
We do not need to wait another decade before we get the 
WGA. There is cross-party support for this, as we all seem 
to believe that this will make a huge difference and be a 
paradigm shift in the way in which we look at public 
finances. Let us therefore get to WGA as soon as possible. 
Let us not wait or put obstacles in the way. (Edward 
Davey, Liberal Democrat MP, Standing Committee A, 
20 January 2000, 11.00am)
The movement towards resource accounting has been a 
bi-partisan, indeed tri-partisan, affair...We all welcome the 
basic ideas. I take those basic ideas to be, first and most 
importantly, the production for the government of a 
straightforward consolidated profit and loss, income and 
expenditure statement; a balance sheet, critically; and a 
cash flow statement. They offer the opportunity for 
parliament and informed commentators, and perhaps 
even eventually for a wider part of the electorate, to 
understand – for the first time, in a form that is 
comprehensible to the ordinary person, including the 
ordinary Member of Parliament – roughly what is gained 
and what is spent by government. That is an 
unambiguously good thing, and we are all in favour of it. 
(Oliver Letwin, Conservative MP, House of Commons 
Hansard Debates, 29 February, Col. 381, 6.34am)
Ezzamel et al. (2005), in a study of the introduction of RAB 
in Northern Ireland, concluded that the quality of 
parliamentary debate had been hindered by a lack of 
accounting knowledge on the part of Members of 
Parliament. While the above quotes suggest that some 
Westminster MPs had an informed but critical view, it was 
also evident that a significant number had limited 
understanding of the technical accounting issues relating 
to the development of both RAB and WGA. For example, 
some MPs clearly chose to place their faith in the C&AG’s 
ability to carry out the necessary checks and balances on 
Parliament’s behalf on such technical accounting matters.
I am not an accountant. I confess to having not read the 
resource accounting manual, which is rather large. I do 
not know whether the many hundreds and thousands of 
decisions about new accounting practices made under 
this initiative are fair and reasonable, but I know that, if 
those decisions were being taken outside Her Majesty’s 
Treasury by a body that, like the C&AG, was genuinely 
independent, I would trust that manual far, far more. 
(Edward Davey, Liberal Democrat MP, House of 
Commons Hansard Debates, 6 December 1999, Col. 
607, 6.21pm)
It also has to be said that the GRAB 1999 was moved 
through Parliament at considerable speed and this not 
only reflected, but may also have contributed to, the 
limited parliamentary discussion on WGA. This was 
apparent in that members in both Houses of Parliament 
suggested that the government, in seeking to secure 
parliamentary acceptance of the bill, had not provided the 
House of Commons’ Public Accounts Committee (PAC) 
and the NAO with sufficient time to scrutinise the bill. In 
addition, the bill was also presented during its reading in 
the House of Lords as a ‘technical’ bill on accounting 
matters, which may well have reduced the numbers 
attending the debate on the bill. Such criticisms came 
from MPs affiliated with opposition parties and also from 
Labour politicians.
From what I hear from my Hon. Friends, who are all in 
favour of a shift to resource accounting, they, like me...are 
profoundly concerned about the speed with which the Bill 
is being introduced, given that there are clear 
reservations throughout the National Audit Office...What is 
happening? If the NAO is resisting, why are we 
proceeding with the Bill in this way? (Dale Campbell-
Savours, Labour MP (now Lord Campbell-Savours), 
House of Commons Hansard Debates, 9 December 
1999, Col. 573, 4.19pm)
Having waited so long, I believe that it is unfortunate that 
there have been criticisms about the lack of consultation 
that took place immediately before the Bill was 
introduced. I understand that the PAC was not consulted 
on the draft Bill and the NAO received the Bill in draft 
form only three weeks before its publication in its present 
form. Therefore, those matters of concern exist and make 
it more difficult to get matters right. (Lord Higgins, 
Conservative, Lords Hansard, Col. 17, 10 April 2000, 
3.22pm)
My Lords, not many weeks ago the House was full to the 
rafters for the debate on Section 28 [another 
parliamentary bill, unrelated to GRAB 1999]; an 
enactment of Parliament which, as I recall noble Lords on 
both sides of the argument said, had never resulted in a 
single prosecution. One cannot help but contrast that 
with this afternoon’s debate. We are a happy few, a band 
of brothers, but we are not present or speaking in vast 
numbers. One might say that perhaps the Treasury did 
not encourage us to be present in vast numbers as its 
own brief on the subject states that the Bill is ‘technical’. 
I am sure that few noble Lords would quarrel with that 
description. (Lord Lipsey, Labour, 10 April 2000, Lords 
Hansard, Col. 36, 4.36pm)
If anything, the NAO’s concerns regarding access 
dominated much of the debating time devoted to GRAB 
10
1999.1 These concerns were subsequently reflected in a 
broader parliamentary review of auditing and 
accountability arrangements in central government (see 
the Sharman Report 2001 and the government’s response 
in HM Treasury 2002). Other time during the 
parliamentary debates was taken up by the government in 
explaining the general merits of WGA, its plans for the 
future and defending any such broad-based claims 
following questions by opposition politicians. 
Overall, there was very little parliamentary discussion on 
the specifics of WGA and little critique or analysis of the 
detailed process and mechanisms by which WGA was 
going to be put together. This may well have reflected MPs’ 
assessments of their own accounting expertise and 
competence – but it also seemed to relate more directly to 
the fact that many of them appeared to see WGA as a 
positive development. This was certainly the case in 
relation to whether WGA could be used to manage matters 
of inter-generational equity and provide a source of 
information on which macroeconomic decisions could be 
taken. Indeed, some expressed views that very much 
echoed the government’s claims on the uses of WGA in the 
original HM Treasury scoping study (1998c: para. 2.19 and 
para. 2.7 respectively). 
In the whole of the post-war period, we have said that the 
economic objectives are high economic growth, low 
inflation, a high level of employment and a balance of 
payments more or less in equilibrium. In many respects, 
if we can get the balance sheet going, there is a strong 
argument for having a balance sheet where you can see 
what is happening in relation to inter-generational 
transfers. A government may seem to be doing well for a 
long time but in fact, all they are merely doing is robbing 
the future to pay the present, or vice versa. So I welcome 
the balance sheet aspect but am sorry that it is not, as 
yet, in a form that would seem to be either 
comprehensible or comprehensive. (Lord Higgins, 
Conservative, Lords Hansard, 10 April 2000, Col. 20, 
3.22pm)
There is an interesting parallel here between the way 
national income accounting has continuously improved 
itself by getting closer to the economic as opposed to the 
accounting basis of income definitions. We still do not 
use those broader definitions of national income in our 
macroeconomic policy making. But, leaving that aside, 
there is still a lot further to go in writing accounts so that 
they will make economic sense. (Lord Desai, Labour, 
Lords Hansard 10 April 2000, Col. 42, 4.59pm)
1. At that time, the NAO was concerned about being responsible 
for auditing the WGA consolidation process even though its 
access to (and ability to inspect the accounts of) some bodies 
included in the consolidation might be restricted because, as 
non-departmental public bodies and public corporations, they do 
not come under its normal audit remit.
Having passed through the House of Commons and the 
House of Lords, the GRAB 1999 became legislation (in the 
form of the Government Resources and Accounts Act – 
GRAA 2000) on 28 July 2000. A separate but related act 
for Northern Ireland was passed a year later in the form of 
GRAA (Northern Ireland) 2001. 
section sUmmAry
This section has reviewed the development of the idea of 
WGA, noting experiences in other countries, the changes in 
the UK government’s attitude to such a project and the 
scale of the claims made for it. It has also traced the 
parliamentary progression of GRAB in the UK, culminating 
in the legislative commitment to produce a form of WGA – 
which, when implemented (and given the scale of the UK 
public sector compared with those of New Zealand and 
Australia), would not only be ‘the most comprehensive set 
of public sector financial statements in the world, as no 
other countries currently include local government’ (HM 
Treasury 2003) – but also ‘one of the most complex 
consolidations in the world and place the UK at the 
forefront of public sector financial reporting’ (HM Treasury 
2004: para. 3.14). 
The UK parliamentary debate revealed a generally high 
level of support for the government’s WGA proposals. 
There was a real attraction to the notion that WGA would 
not only enhance accountability in the parliamentary 
reporting sense, but could also be used for purposes of 
macroeconomic management, developing financial 
management processes within central government 
departments, and stimulating a general improvement in 
the consistency and accuracy of public sector accounting 
systems. That said, it has to be acknowledged that the 
parliamentary debating time on GRAB was limited and the 
debate itself was not very detailed in terms of assessing 
WGA and the associated implementation timescales. 
Questions could also be raised about the general level of 
accounting expertise or interest among politicians and the 
potential diluting effect that this had on parliamentary 
interest in GRAB 1999 and its expected achievements.
From a policy perspective, the debates clearly demonstrate 
the UK governmental practice of committing to reforms 
and then undergoing experimentation in the form of a 
series of ‘dry runs’ (see Lüder and Jones 2003 for some 
discussion on this point). The implications of such an 
approach to policy formation will be considered in 
subsequent sections of this report as attention turns to the 
practical development and implementation of WGA.
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introdUction
The UK government’s motives for wanting WGA were 
significantly different, or at least more expansive, once the 
Labour government came into power in 1997. The original 
parliamentary call during the previous (Conservative-led) 
government for a form of consolidated government 
accounting was underpinned by a stated desire to improve 
accountability. This desire had two central aspects. The 
first was to improve the presentation of accounts, driven 
by a view that existing forms of financial reporting were 
making it difficult for Parliament to get a good, overall 
picture of central government’s assets and liabilities. The 
second was a concern that a significant number of bodies 
might fall outside the RAB boundaries, even though they 
were under the funding regime and influence of central 
government. Although the Conservative government had 
been initially reluctant to pursue CGA, by 1994 it duly 
advocated it as a tool that would help to produce a more 
comprehensive view of the government’s ‘balance sheet’ 
(HM Treasury 1994: para. 2.24; see also Chow et al. 2007: 
29–30). 
Following the 1997 election, the new government not only 
pursued a larger-scaled consolidation (moving from CGA 
to WGA), but also claimed that WGA could be used as a 
vehicle for improving macroeconomic decision making 
(HM Treasury 1998a). WGA was held out as supporting the 
various economic reforms proposed in the EFSR (HM 
Treasury 1998a). The EFSR was a policy document 
outlining the proposals for major macroeconomic policy 
changes, which included a commitment by the 
government to move to RAB, the introduction and 
adherence of the Code for Fiscal Stability (CFS – which 
includes the golden rule and the sustainable investment 
rule), and granting independence to the Bank of England 
(the UK’s central bank) to set interest rates. 
The government’s linkage of WGA with other 
(macroeconomic) reforms proposed in the EFSR 
represented a significant departure from the original aims 
of CGA to improve governmental financial reporting and 
accountability (see Chow et al. 2007 for a more in-depth 
discussion). The EFSR sought to improve the standing and 
sophistication of the economic management strategies of 
the incoming Labour government, given that the party was 
not perceived as having a strong reputation historically in 
this regard (Coates and Hay 2001; King 2005). The EFSR 
did not enlarge the case for WGA in any great depth. It 
noted that information from the WGA balance sheet could 
be used to target the golden rule (HM Treasury 1998c: 
para.2.6) and that, for fiscal purposes, this necessitated 
expanding the consolidation boundary from CGA to WGA – 
but no detailed explanation was provided as to why it had 
been earlier determined by the government that a CGA 
basis was sufficient to meet parliamentary demands (HM 
Treasury 1998c: para. 2.37). 
The government attempted to provide a clearer 
explanation for the role of WGA within the wider decision-
making process in a book published two years after the 
GRAA had been passed (see HM Treasury 2002). This 
represented WGA as a reporting tool alongside RAB but 
emphasised that information from WGA would also be fed 
back into the policy-making process underpinning the 
fiscal framework laid out in the EFSR. Interestingly, the 
concept of using consolidated whole of government 
accounts for macroeconomic decision making is not new. 
As Chow et al. (2007) point out, in the mid-1980s the UK 
government had considered, but, ultimately, did not 
pursue, targeting the balance sheet net worth as a fiscal 
management tool (albeit using National Accounts-based 
rather than GAAP-based information). The subsequent 
proposed use of WGA for macroeconomic decision making 
had strong parallels with developments in Australia. For 
example, Mellor (1996), a key figure working for the New 
South Wales (NSW) Treasury during the inception of WGA, 
argues that a WGA balance sheet should be used in 
processes of macroeconomic management to provide a 
more complete financial picture, improve resource 
management and transparency, and link financial planning 
and short-term budgeting. Mellor suggests that better 
asset management and long-term planning is engendered 
by incorporating assets onto balance sheets and through 
more in-depth reporting of unfunded pensions liabilities. 
She also claims that WGA encourages greater 
consideration for inter-generational equity, where the 
incorporation of forward projections of assets and 
liabilities assists in terms of assessing the fiscal 
sustainability of particular government policies. 
A number of recent developments have provided further 
details of HM Treasury’s intention for WGA to be of 
macroeconomic policy relevance. For example, the 
Treasury Committee (2006) makes it clear that Parliament 
expects WGA-based information to be used to underpin 
the sustainable investment rule in the CFS. The sustainable 
investment rule self-imposes a ceiling on the debt that the 
government can take on, stipulating that public sector net 
debt should be maintained below 40% of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) for each year of the economic cycle. The 
Treasury Committee (2006: para.45) acknowledges that 
there are limitations related to the arbitrary nature of the 
self-imposed 40% ceiling, but stresses the importance of 
such fiscal constraints in preventing government from 
taking on unsustainable debt levels that may damage the 
economic prospects of future generations. Such 
declarations (and the encompassing reliance on 
consolidated accounting information) are significant. When 
the golden rule in the CFS is represented as international 
best practice in terms of government economic policy, 
WGA, by association, becomes seen as best governmental 
practice.
3. the development and implementation of WGA
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the implementAtion of WGA in the UK
HM Treasury is responsible for implementing WGA. A 
government reporting unit was established within the HM 
Treasury directorate of Financial Management Reporting 
and Audit2 specifically for the purpose of implementing 
WGA. The responsibility for implementing WGA within this 
unit was delegated to two work-teams: the Government 
Financial Information and Reporting Team and the 
Financial Reporting Policy Team. Sir Andrew Likierman 
originally headed up the Financial Management Reporting 
and Audit directorate, being succeeded by Dame Mary 
Keegan in September 2004, who was herself replaced by 
Jon Thompson in April 2008.
2. This directorate, now known as Government Financial 
Management, is one of five directorates across which HM 
Treasury functions are organised. The other directorates are 
Ministerial and Corporate Services; Budget, Tax and Welfare; 
International and Finance; and Public Services and Growth.
The original scoping study (HM Treasury 1998c) 
recommended a staged approach to implementing WGA. 
The desire for a gradual consolidation of the various tiers 
of government was influenced by a range of matters 
including: anticipated practical difficulties in consolidating 
a large and diverse number of bodies; ensuring 
consistency in accounting policies; and allowing reporting 
systems and procedures to be developed in a progressive 
and manageable way. The scoping study’s proposed 
development timetable for WGA, reproduced in Table 3.1 
below, comprised three main stages. The first stage was 
the development of a WGA using (the statistics-based) 
National Accounts information. The second stage required 
the development of a GAAP-based CGA. The final stage 
would extend the consolidation from a GAAP-based CGA 
to WGA, more than tripling the number of bodies included 
in the consolidation. 
Table 3.1: Summary of the proposed development timetable for the staged approach to WGA 
Year GAAP-based WGA Statistically-based WGA
1998
Establish legal requirements. Full cost–benefit 
analysis of consolidating CG bodies into CGA.
Detailed assessment of the resources needed to 
produce ESA-based WGA.
1999
Begin work needed to consolidate CGA, including 
alignment of accounting policies and elimination 
of intra-group transactions. Cost–benefit analysis 
of consolidating LAs and other public sector 
bodies into WGA.
Undertake work needed to resolve issues of data 
quality and incorporation of items not currently 
covered by National Accounts.
2000
Expand work on CGA to cover PCs accountable to 
Minister’s decision in light of progress on whether 
to aim for published dry run CGA for 2001/02. 
Pilots and research to see how best to widen 
scope of the account to cover whole public sector. Continue/complete this work.
2001
Begin alignment of accounting policies and 
financial years and elimination of intra-group 
transactions for WGA. Possible dry run CGA.
First set of illustrative accounts produced for 
2000/01. First illustrative quarterly outturn data.
2002
Continue/complete process of alignment of 
accounting policies and financial years and 
elimination of intra-group transactions for WGA. 
Possible first set of published dry run CGA.
First set of published accounts produced for 
2001/02. First published quarterly outturn data.
2003 Possible further set of published dry run CGA.
2004 First set of trial WGA for 2003/04 (unaudited).
2005 Second set of trial WGA for 2004/05 (unaudited).
2006
First fully audited and published set of WGA for 
2005/06.
 
Source: reproduced from the scoping study (HM Treasury 1998c: 65).
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The scoping study estimated that the costs of WGA 
development and implementation would be £250,000 for 
each of the first two years and £150,000 for each of the 
two dry run years following these (HM Treasury 1998c: 4 
and para. 4.88). These estimates were based on the costs 
likely to be incurred in setting up a project team in HM 
Treasury to manage the process and to cover IT costs 
related to the consolidation exercise (HM Treasury 1998c: 
4 and paras 4.89–4.90). Annual running costs (including 
audit costs) once the system was operational were 
estimated at £1m–£2m. The scoping study indicated that 
further work was, however, needed to provide more 
accurate cost estimates.
The actual progression of WGA through these stages of 
development is now considered in greater detail, together 
with resulting changes in governmental accounting 
systems, associated staff training processes and auditing 
arrangements.
stage 1
The first stage in the WGA process involved the production 
of a dry run, statistically based CGA for the year April 
2001 to March 2002. The government had, in 1998, 
claimed that it was necessary to start off with an interim 
CGA based on National Accounts data produced by the 
Office for National Statistics (ONS) and prepared using the 
European System of Accounts 1995 (ESA95) standard – 
the legally mandated reporting standard for national 
statistics set by the European Union (EU) and based on 
the United Nations’ System of National Accounts (1993) or 
SNA93. During this stage, it was intended that such a CGA 
would be useful for underpinning the fiscal framework 
introduced in the EFSR in the short and medium term (eg 
the golden rule and sustainable investment rule in the 
Code for Fiscal Stability), until a fully GAAP-based WGA 
could be produced (HM Treasury 1998c: paras 5.1–5.3, 
6.16). 
The National (statistical) Accounts divide the UK economy 
into different sectors, of which the public or governmental 
sector is one. This sector is further sub-divided into central 
government and local authorities (HM Treasury 1998c: 
para. E3). The central government component from the 
National Accounts was used to prepare the initial CGA. In 
completing this stage, the government announced that in 
its ‘development of CGA it has identified solutions to many 
of the issues that will need to be overcome in producing 
WGA. The Government was then confident that WGA can 
be produced and intends publishing them for the first time 
for 2006–07’ (HM Treasury 2003). In practice, the process 
has been more problematic, with not even the stage 1, dry 
run, statistical CGA, having been published to date. 
stage 2
Stage 2 in the development of UK WGA involved the 
development of a GAAP-based CGA. In stage 2, the 
government planned to produce dry run CGAs for three 
years (2001/2, 2002/3 and 2003/4), incorporating some 
300 bodies (Statutory Instrument No. 486, 2005). The 
consolidation boundary for CGA incorporated central 
government departments (eg Department for Transport, 
HM Treasury), non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs) 
and Central Funds. The parliamentary accounting 
standards watchdog (see FRAB 2004: para. 2.7) argued, 
however, that such a boundary definition was not fully 
GAAP compliant, because Trading Funds and Public 
Corporations were not included in the CGA consolidation, 
despite being controlled by central government. 
The C&AG’s report (2005: paras 1.92–1.95), during stage 
2, on the development of WGA indicated that significant 
progress had been made in the following areas:
changing accounting for taxation income from a cash •	
to an accruals basis
recognition of assets and liabilities of central •	
government on an accruals basis
reporting pensions liabilities for central government on •	
an FRS 17 Retirement Benefits (ASB 2000) basis.
Nonetheless, the C&AG (2005: para. 1.98) also identified a 
number of areas where problems had been encountered 
and further improvement was required: 
in identifying inter-entity transactions and balances in •	
the consolidation process between CGA bodies, where 
difficulties of identification had been found
in the collection of information relating to FRS17 •	
requirements and contingent liabilities. 
The C&AG (2005: para. 1.99) also highlighted significant 
issues that needed to be addressed in moving from stage 
2 to stage 3 (CGA to WGA), including inconsistencies in 
accounting for fixed assets between central government 
and other bodies included in the wider WGA consolidation, 
agreement of the WGA boundary, and coordination of the 
audit effort between non-CGA bodies. The C&AG (2006: 
paras 3.62–64) also expressed his ‘disappointment’ with 
the ‘lack of visible progress’ (para. 3.64) in HM Treasury’s 
continuing reliance on accounting for PFI projects on the 
government’s balance sheet, preferring instead to rely on 
its interpretation of Application Note F in FRS 5 (ASB 
1994; 1998a; 1998b; see also related accounting 
interpretation in HM Treasury 1998b) that allows for the 
off-balance sheet treatment of PFI projects that meet 
GAAP criteria. This difference in opinion between the 
C&AG and HM Treasury over the balance sheet status of 
PFI projects spanned all three dry-run years of stage 2 of 
the WGA project (from 2001 to 2004). 
Stage 2 has been completed, but FRAB (2006: para. 1.17) 
expressed its disappointment that the accounts of the 
dry-run full CGA for 2003/4 had not yet been published. 
The C&AG also echoed similar concerns to FRAB when 
pronouncing, ‘the delay in publication of CGA would 
damage public confidence in the WGA programme’ (as 
quoted in Treasury Committee 2006: para. 47). HM 
Treasury’s response to the criticisms was that the 
‘complexity of accounting issues around producing a set of 
accounts encompassing the whole of government means 
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that inevitably [preparation of WGA] will take some time’ 
(Treasury Committee 2006: para. 47). To date, none of the 
three dry run full CGAs have been published.
stage 3
On 10 December 2003, the government formally 
committed itself (as part of its pre-budget report)  (issued 
during stage 2) to extending CGA to WGA and allocated 
one ‘dry-run’ year in 2004/5 to sort out any 
implementation issues (C&AG 2005: para. 1.91) – with the 
expectation that publication of the first set of WGA would 
be in 2006 (covering the year 2005/6). This original 
timetable has been revised on a number of occasions, with 
the current plan being that the first fully audited and 
published set of WGA will be for 2009/10. Despite delays, 
the claims made for WGA continue to be strong ones. For 
instance, the C&AG’s (2008) assessment of progress with 
WGA contained the following assertions: 
The move to WGA is a significant one that will have many 
advantages. Comprehensive, audited public sector 
financial information based on internationally recognised 
accounting standards will be available for the first time, 
and will contribute significantly to policy formulation and 
resource allocation, and will raise the quality of debate on 
the public finances. The Comptroller and Auditor General 
remains committed to working with the Treasury and 
other bodies across the public sector in making a success 
of the WGA project and, in so doing, increasing the 
accountability and transparency of the whole public 
sector (para. 3.6).
The extension from CGA to WGA involves the consolidation 
of a further 1,000 bodies (more than 600 local 
governments, over 300 National Health Service (NHS) and 
Foundation Trusts, and about 60 Public Corporations and 
Trading Funds) (C&AG 2006: para. 1.96). The approach 
requires individual departments to perform a sub-
consolidation of the bodies that they control, followed by a 
submission of a single entity statement to HM Treasury, 
which will then undertake the top-level consolidation. The 
expansion of CGA to WGA has similarly experienced 
difficulties in implementation. The 2008 Budget report, for 
instance, stated that the revised 2009/10 target date 
‘would allow time to complete the alignment of local and 
central government accounting policies and to enable WGA 
to be published on an IFRS basis’ (HM Treasury 2008: 
para. C103). FRAB (2006: para. 1. 13; 2007a: para. 3.31) 
highlighted the significance of alignment issues, noting 
that while the local government road network is valued at 
historical cost, the motorway and trunk road network is 
valued at current cost on central government’s accounts. 
Accounting for PFI projects is a further example of the 
problems that WGA has faced, with FRAB stating that it 
has ‘misgivings about the consistent interpretation of 
accounting guidance across the public sector, and...
remains deeply concerned about the missing assets 
associated with those PFI schemes’ (FRAB 2006: para. 
1.20). The planned move towards IFRS (see HM Treasury 
2007a: para. 6.60) has led HM Treasury to announce that 
Technical Note 1 on accounting for PFI projects (HM 
Treasury 1998b) will ‘no longer be relevant’ once IFRS is in 
place for the year 2008/9 (FRAB 2007a: para. 3.5; FRAB 
2007b: para. 7). FRAB has suggested that HM Treasury 
consider adopting Interpretation No.12 on Service 
Concessions of the International Financial Reporting 
Interpretations Committee (IFRIC) as a guide in its 
development of a replacement for Technical Note 1 on 
accounting for PFI projects (FRAB 2007a: paras 2.13 and 
3.6–3.10). The major implication of IFRIC 12 is that the 
criteria for classifying PFI on the government’s balance 
sheet will change, moving from an assessment of risk and 
rewards to an increased emphasis on which party controls 
the PFI infrastructure (see FRAB 2007a: para.2.13). The 
impact of adopting international accounting standards 
would therefore bring on balance sheet many of these PFI 
schemes. 
AccoUntinG informAtion systems 
developments
The initial information system used to collect CGA 
information was derived from National Accounts 
information. From stage 2 onwards a new system, the 
Government Online Database (GOLD) was introduced. 
GOLD was a Web-based system used to gather the audited 
annual outturn (ie accounting) data from the individual 
bodies included in the consolidation process. This 
information was then recast using a standardised chart of 
accounts, pre-specified by GOLD, to generate WGA. This 
standardised chart of accounts was created to align the 
information gathered from the accounts of individual 
bodies that were not uniform in format. 
HM Treasury interviewees explained that the software 
underpinning GOLD was imported from New Zealand and 
Australia, and subsequently adapted for UK purposes. In 
addition to GOLD, use was also made of two existing 
information systems. One was Public Expenditure 
Statistics (PES), a Treasury database storing five years’ 
worth of historical data and two projection timelines, one 
for a year ahead, and the other for three years ahead. The 
second system was the General Expenditure Monitoring 
System (GEMS), a Treasury database providing more 
detailed outturn and forecast figures for the current 
financial year. Data recorded in GEMS involved projections 
on a monthly, quarterly and annual basis. 
Stage 3 has seen the replacement of these multiple 
information systems (ie GOLD, PES and GEMS) through an 
HM Treasury (2005a, 2005b) scheme known as the Single 
Data System programme. This scheme was designed to 
bring together all public sector financial data (historical, 
current and projections, annual and monthly/quarterly 
data) in one system – referred to as the ‘Combined Online 
Information System’ (COINS). This over-arching database 
sought to establish a more uniform structure in terms of 
how information is collected and to alleviate the 
inconsistencies that have emerged from having three 
separate accounting systems for public sector data (GOLD, 
PES and GEMS) (Atkinson Review 2005: para. 5.44). It was 
also designed to reduce the burden of data collection on, 
and duplication across, departments. Ian Carruthers, the 
former head of HM Treasury’s WGA programme and one of 
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the architects of COINS, also claimed that: 
COINS is designed to significantly improve the quality 
and accessibility of expenditure monitoring and forecast 
information available to Treasury teams. By providing a 
definitive view of each department’s finances, more 
closely linked to the way it runs its business, COINS will 
support an increased focus on in-year monitoring, and 
underpin other financial management work currently in 
progress. (HM Treasury 2005a: 4, col. 1, para. 4)
COINS was recommended by the National Statistics 
Quality Review of Government Accounts and Indicators 
(NSQRGAI) as one solution for dealing with a number of 
issues highlighted in the Atkinson Review (2005: para. 5.5) 
regarding output measurement, such as:
complexity of data flows involving multiple suppliers •	
accuracy in codifying and mapping data into the •	
various databases
poor timeliness.•	
The claimed planned benefits of adopting COINS (see 
Atkinson Review 2005: para. 5.40) include:
improved data quality at reduced cost•	
a central warehouse for collecting and sharing data •	
requiring a single input
facility for managers to cross-check data across bodies, •	
reducing the need to reconcile and/or explain 
differences in balances
easier comparison and reconciliation between balances •	
produced by the ONS and HM Treasury. 
The information produced by COINS (which went live in 
2005/6) is used for three distinct functions – budgeting, 
recording government spending, and the preparation of 
audited financial statements. It is largely through the third 
element that the accounts for WGA are generated. In 
practical accounting terms, COINS requires individual 
government departments to convert their end-of-year, final 
Trial Balance into the format required for resource 
accounts. For WGA purposes, the financial year-end is 
taken to be 31 March. 
The responsibility for mapping the accounting data into 
COINS rests with the individual government departments/
public sector bodies. HM Treasury has produced a 
guidance pack and provides a dedicated phone service for 
those bodies needing further assistance. In terms of WGA, 
individual central government departments map their trial 
balance onto the standard accounts used by COINS. 
HM Treasury then inputs this information into COINS to 
produce its own (WGA) interpretation of the Balance Sheet 
and the Income and Expenditure account. For local 
government, the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG) supplies data from local government.3 
An HM Treasury official in charge of managing the 
operations of COINS for WGA purposes explained, in 
interview, that government departments and other bodies 
such as local government are also required to produce a 
second set of trial balances to identify inter-entity 
transactions between the various public sector bodies in 
WGA.
As an information system, COINS has been developed with 
many ‘firewalls’ that prevent individual reporting bodies 
from having access to the whole consolidation process. 
Instead, bodies are only allowed access to data that they 
are responsible for producing or using. This design follows 
the recommendations of the NAO (see, for example, C&AG 
2007: para. 3.10). The firewalls protect the overall integrity 
of the data from manipulation by individual bodies. For 
example, those who are in charge of preparing the 
consolidation of the accounts are not allowed access to the 
budgetary side of the data, reducing the possibility of 
accounting manipulation for political ends (eg choosing 
accounting policies to fit budgetary needs). Access 
restrictions do, however, serve to emphasise that the value 
and/or use of a ‘centralised’ WGA to those further down 
the reporting hierarchy (eg departments and individual 
bodies producing data) is likely to be questionable, with 
WGA being of most use to those with the fullest degree of 
access (eg HM Treasury).
The move towards a unified system such as COINS is 
being accompanied by parallel developments by the ONS, 
which is aligning some of its existing data sources for 
National Accounts (such as those for capital consumption) 
more closely with those of the RAB/WGA programme 
(HM Treasury 2006a). Nonetheless, the Atkinson Review 
has noted that COINS alone cannot and should not be 
seen as the cure for all the problems generated from the 
use of multiple information systems (2005 para. 5.44).
WGA trAininG And edUcAtion 
HM Treasury has put in place a number of mechanisms for 
training and educating departments on how WGA will 
affect them and what processes they will have to 
undertake to comply with the WGA requirements. HM 
Treasury has assisted in this role through involvement at 
training events designed to update staff on WGA project 
progress. Continuing Professional Development (CPD) 
forums are held to update Treasury staff on WGA progress, 
while a phone line and a website (www.wga.gov.uk) provide 
support for government departments that require further 
assistance in submitting their accounts to Treasury. 
Other organisations with an interest in WGA, such as CIPFA 
in relation to local government in England and Wales, also 
play an active role in terms of training and advice to 
accounting staff. CIPFA supported the Labour 
government’s proposals for WGA in the 1998 scoping 
3. The responsibility for the input of budgetary data, however, is 
different – see HM Treasury 2006b for further details.
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study and has regularly sought to communicate local 
government views on WGA to HM Treasury. As one CIPFA 
interviewee acknowledged:
CIPFA has a standard role for local government and the 
preponderance of our members are in local government. 
The implications of the WGA project for local government 
were quite significant. CIPFA were quite keen to also 
dispel disquiet about the resource implications of WGA 
for local government...its discussions with Treasury led 
CIPFA to form the view that this was going to be done in 
the most cost-effective way possible in terms of data 
collection from local government and that local 
government was not going to be subjected to a large 
bureaucratic exercise which basically involved putting 
together a second set of accounts. I think there were 
certain misgivings from people that it could be a big 
resource-intensive burden. 
According to another interviewee (in charge of preparing 
local government accounting information for WGA 
purposes), CIPFA and the WGA phone line of HM Treasury 
have been the two most important sources of information 
for local government accounting officials. He also noted 
that most of the training provided by HM Treasury on how 
to prepare for the process of submitting WGA data was 
indirect, where local government officers relied on HM 
Treasury to make available instruction lists to assist with 
the preparation of the required accounting information.
the AUdit of WGA
In terms of auditing arrangements, the C&AG and his team 
at the NAO are responsible for the audit of all central 
government bodies and the final WGA consolidation 
(Section 11, GRAA 2000). For bodies that are not within 
the C&AG’s remit but within the WGA boundary (eg local 
government and devolved governments), the C&AG will 
have to rely on the work of individual statutory auditors in 
forming his opinion on WGA (C&AG 2007: para. 3.11). The 
NAO has set up a working group of the Public Audit Forum 
(PAF) to discuss the results of the dry-run audit process of 
WGA by all audit bodies concerned. The PAF is a working 
group jointly established by the NAO with other auditors 
such as Audit Scotland, the Northern Ireland Audit Office, 
the Wales Audit Office, the Audit Commission and auditors 
appointed by the latter (for local government and NHS 
trusts) to determine the scope of the work and to establish 
working protocols for the dry-run WGA audit of 2005/6 
(C&AG 2007: para. 3.12). The C&AG has been granted 
powers, under the new UK Companies Act 2006, to audit 
government-owned companies. This extension of audit 
powers was the culmination of the recommendation made 
in the Sharman report (2001), addressing concerns that 
central government departments were creating 
government-owned companies that the C&AG could not 
audit, as they were considered to be private enterprises 
(Sharman Report 2001; C&AG 2007: paras 3.16–3.17). 
section sUmmAry
This section has described the motives for and the 
developmental process of WGA. WGA was originally a 
Parliament-driven initiative, but since the election of the 
Labour government in 1997, the role for WGA has 
expanded. This expansion has encompassed the use of 
WGA information for economic policy-making purposes, 
whereby such information is said to be useful in planning 
for inter-generational equity, asset and debt management, 
and pensions. While the claims that WGA information 
could be used for more active purposes of economic 
management (rather than just for reporting purposes) are 
not new, having originated in Australia, they have certainly 
broadened the scope of the WGA project in the UK. 
This section also described the three-stage 
implementation process associated with WGA in the UK 
(the third stage is currently under way, although no WGA 
reports from this stage nor any previous stage have, as yet, 
been published). In stage 1, efforts were devoted to 
constructing CGA using statistical (rather than GAAP-
based) accounting information taken from UK National 
Accounts. Stage 2 saw the pursuit of CGA using GAAP-
based resource accounts, consolidating the accounts 
obtained from individual central government departments 
and other public sector organisations. During this stage, 
the government came under scrutiny from the NAO 
because the chosen consolidation boundaries were not 
considered sufficient to include all relevant bodies. Stage 3 
has seen the WGA project expand beyond the central 
government boundary to include local governments, the 
NHS, and a number of other public sector-related 
organisations, such as public corporations. The transition 
from stage 2 to stage 3 presents a significant logistical 
task for the government and a number of issues remain 
unresolved, such as delays with the submission of 
accounts and difficulties in reconciling inter-entity 
transfers between bodies. These problems are discussed 
further in the next section as we now turn to evaluate the 
UK WGA experience to date.
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introdUction
In evaluating the UK experience to date with WGA, it makes 
sense to focus on the three key claims that the government 
has made for it. The first claim was that WGA would 
enhance governmental decision making, especially at the 
macroeconomic level. The second was that of increased 
accountability, where the publication of a consolidated 
government balance sheet would make the use of public 
money more transparent. The third claim was that WGA 
would provide an impetus for improving the accounting 
processes within and across public sector bodies. 
improvinG GovernmentAl (mAcroeconomic) 
decision mAKinG
In the House of Lords debate relating to GRAB 1999, a key 
parliamentary expectation, as exemplified in the quotes 
cited earlier (in section 2) by Lord Higgins and Lord Desai, 
was for WGA to be used to improve national economic 
management. Of particular importance in this debate was 
the belief that WGA would help in terms of planning for 
issues of inter-generational equity. This has become an 
important issue in many developed nations, owing to an 
ageing population profile and concerns over the 
sustainability of public sector pensions and government 
finances (Chan 2003). Our fieldwork sought to consider 
the ability of WGA to facilitate macroeconomic 
management processes and we approached the issue in 
two, complementary, ways. The first was to consider, 
briefly, the historical development of consolidated 
accounting techniques in a private-sector context and 
assess whether this has any salient lessons for similar 
initiatives in a public sector context. The second drew on 
our interviews with a range of individuals involved in the 
practical development of WGA in the UK, considering, in 
particular, their perceptions of its current or likely future 
contribution to macroeconomic management processes. 
Considering the history of private sector consolidated 
accounting, HM Treasury’s desire to learn from private 
sector experience, as highlighted by the quote below from 
the parliamentary debates on GRAB 1999, was important 
in the adoption of consolidated accounting techniques for 
the public sector. ‘The purpose of the WGA clauses in the 
Bill [GRAB] is to enable the Treasury to prepare as 
efficiently as possible by adopting relevant best practice 
consolidation procedures used in the private sector’ 
(Andrew Smith, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Labour, 
House of Commons Hansard Debates for 6 December 
1999, Col. 577, 4.19pm)
As there is such a commitment to learning from private 
sector experience, it is worth reviewing the historical 
development of consolidated accounting in this domain, 
particularly in terms of the motives for adopting, and 
experiences with, such a form of accounting practice. Our 
historical analysis serves to illustrate some of the 
conceptual choices made in the pursuit of accounting 
change and some potentially problematic issues or 
constraining factors that might be transferred to the public 
sector if inadequate attention is given to the lessons of 
history. 
Consolidation accounting in the UK first emerged in the 
early 1900s – Edwards (1991) discovered that Pearson and 
Knowles Coal and Iron Company Ltd, a manufacturing 
company in England, had published a set of consolidated 
accounts in 1910. Edwards went on to argue, however, that 
this ‘obscure’ publication had no influence on the 
subsequent adoption of consolidated accounts by British 
companies. Instead, he contended that the adoption of 
consolidated accounting among large British companies 
started only in 1922, when Nobel Industries (now known 
as ICI) first published a set of consolidated accounts.4 In 
addition, ideas on consolidation accounting, which were 
pioneered in the US at the turn of the 20th century, were 
disseminated in the UK in 1922 through a series of 
lectures organised for the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) by Sir Gilbert 
Garnsey of Price Waterhouse, who had just returned from 
the US (Edwards 1991; Edwards and Webb 1984; Kitchen 
1972; and Walker 1978). 
Edwards and Webb (1984) suggest that at the time of their 
study the managers of British companies were generally 
opposed to consolidation accounting because it would give 
them less opportunity to create secret reserves and 
‘smooth’ income. In a review of the literature on the history 
of consolidated accounting, Nobes and Parker (2004: 43) 
note that the Companies Act of 1928/9 contained no 
requirements for consolidation accounting, and point out 
that the ICAEW had in fact voted against requiring 
companies to produce consolidation accounts during the 
consultation period before the 1928/9 Act and its 
amendment were passed. This was in stark contrast to the 
pro-consolidation stance of the Law Society. In the 1920s, 
consolidated accounts were used merely to supplement 
the conventional balance sheet (Bircher 1988) by 
reporting on investments in more detail than their cost, 
with private subsidiaries, at that time, being exempt from 
publication requirements (Nobes and Parker 2004: 43). 
Consolidation accounting was made a requirement only 
when the London Stock Exchange made it a condition for 
the issue of new shares from 1939 onwards. Subsequently, 
the 1948 Companies Act made consolidation accounting 
in the UK compulsory for groups of companies. 
Bircher (1988) argues that in addition to impending 
legislation (ie the Companies Act 1948), the adoption of 
consolidated accounting was assisted by increasing 
gearing levels in companies, changes in the tax laws, and 
pressures to reduce the amount of dividends paid. This 
suggests that an over-arching motive for adopting 
consolidated accounting in the private sector was to obtain 
tangible economic benefits, such as assisting companies 
to access debt finance or reduce agency costs (Mora and 
Rees 1998; Whittred 1987). 
It has been claimed that, in the US, private sector 
accounting standard setters have pioneered consolidated 
4. Even here, Edwards (1991: 131) explains that the method 
used was merely a simple aggregation of accounts, where inter-
entity transactions were not eliminated, rather than the 
consolidation process we are familiar with today.
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accounting methods to help understand the economic 
environment in which companies were operating (see 
Nobes and Parker 2004: 373). Consolidated accounting 
has also been seen as a method that could be used to 
bridge the different legal and reporting requirements that 
existed between states within the American federal 
system. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), 
with accounting standard SFAS No. 94 (1987), made it a 
requirement that listed group companies produce 
consolidated accounts, regardless of the compatibility of 
the businesses that were added together in the 
consolidation – reflecting the FASB’s desire to outlaw 
attempts by companies to indulge in off-balance sheet 
financing (see Mian and Smith 1990). Consolidated 
accounting has, over the years, become the accepted 
international standard, although it has not been without its 
critics and has been historically less attractive or accepted 
in some national contexts (Nobes and Parker 2004: 41–4, 
373–82). Some such criticisms are quite longstanding. For 
instance, in terms of the value of consolidated accounting 
to users of the accounts, Walker (1976, 1978) argues that 
the production of consolidated reports (in comparison with 
producing individual reports for the parent company and 
its subsidiaries) does not necessarily increase or improve 
the ability of shareholders and creditors to assess the 
potential for future earnings and/or ability to repay debt. 
Instead, the consolidation can hide the losses of weaker 
subsidiaries in the group and downplay the profits of the 
stronger subsidiaries, which can mislead creditors (Walker 
1976). In a relatively recent review, Clarke et al. (2003: 
218) made similar points regarding the value of 
consolidated accounting:
Whether consolidation accounting practices should be 
tolerated is contestable. Accounting data are reasonably 
expected to reflect financial reality in its legal, social and 
economic contexts. And whereas reality might be less 
than transparent, consolidated financial data cannot by 
any stroke of the imagination be considered a realistic 
reflection of the aggregative wealth and progress of the 
related companies, being as they are aggregations of 
their separate conventional accounting data – some as 
they appear in the originals, some adjusted to 
accommodate presumed, often counterfactual, 
characteristics of the transactions between them. 
Relatively recent corporate scandals, including the 
notorious collapse of Enron, have cast renewed doubt on 
the value of consolidated accounting to users, particularly 
given the nature of practices with respect to ‘special 
purpose entities’ (Hartgraves and Benston 2002). A critical 
factor here has frequently been the adequacy of the 
specification of the consolidation boundary and the failure 
to control corporate managers’ capacities for engaging in 
various forms of off-balance sheet financing and creative 
accounting (Hartgraves and Benston 2002; AAAFASC 
2003). 
In summary, the history of consolidated accounting is one 
that reveals a range of motives for its existence and a fair 
degree of doubt over its capacity to deliver in terms of 
desired levels of transparency and accurate reporting of 
corporate activities, wealth and commitments. While its 
critics may remain in the minority, the persistence of their 
criticisms and the evident fact that the use of consolidated 
accounting has not resulted in the demise of creative 
accounting and corporate accounting scandals is pertinent 
in terms of the expectations for WGA. It certainly poses 
questions about the extent to which consolidated accounts 
will prove useful in assessing the government’s ability to 
pay its debts and whether the highly aggregated nature of 
the accounts will reduce the number of users who might 
find the accounts helpful. Additionally, there is clearly no 
historical attempt, at least in the private sector, specifically 
to use the balance sheet as a tool for economic planning. 
Private sector consolidation accounting has a strong focus 
on issues of accountability (eg presentation of group debt, 
representation of entities controlled by the parent), 
reflected in an accounting approach that has traditionally 
concentrated on past transactions and notions of 
prudence. This, again, sits interestingly in light of the 
government’s consideration of accounting for future 
income projections (ie economic ideas of defining income 
and net worth based on predictions of future cash flows) – 
see HM Treasury (2005c). 
AccoUntinG for pUblic sector finAnce
The traditional source for accounting information on public 
sector finances for the purposes of economic policy 
making has been the UK’s National Accounts, published by 
the Office for National Statistics (ONS). With the advent of 
WGA, the government sought to use this GAAP-based 
system to replace, or at least complement, National 
Accounts information for macroeconomic decision making 
(see HM Treasury 1998c: 62–8). 
National accounting in the UK was first developed towards 
the end of the Second World War (Studenski 1958, as 
cited in Jones 2000). Since then, various forms of ‘UK 
National Accounts’ have been prepared to aid in economic 
and social policy formulation and monitoring, and used to 
represent the public sector balance sheet (on a statistical 
accounting basis). The statistical accounting policies used 
to produce National Accounts are based on international 
standards promoted by the United Nations (UN), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and the European Commission (HM 
Treasury 2005b: para. 5.2). The information collected for 
the preparation of the UK National Accounts is used to 
produce key economic statistics such as GDP. 
Although both statistical and GAAP-based accounting 
systems claim to measure government economic activity, 
there are a number of conceptual differences between the 
two. According to HM Treasury (2005b: para.5.15): 
National accounts are designed primarily for economic 
analysis, showing economic activity by sector of the 
economy. The main focus of National Accounts is 
therefore on the income and consumption in each of the 
various sectors (and sub-sectors) of the economy rather 
than on individual entities’ financial performance. GAAP, 
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on the other hand, has been developed to reflect the 
financial performance and position of individual 
organisations.
In particular, the accounting information from National 
Accounts is aggregated according to the sectors of the 
economy (eg government, financial corporations and the 
household sector), making it difficult to report on the 
economic output of a single entity within government, such 
as a government department. The Office for National 
Statistics also relies on estimated data for certain sectors/
sub-sectors of the economy (including the public sector) if 
the data are difficult to obtain (HM Treasury 2005b: 
para.5.13). Accounting information from central 
government departments needs to be obtained from 
annual departmental reports – which were kept on a cash 
basis before RAB/WGA. 
Another important area where GAAP and National 
Accounts differ significantly is in the timing of cost 
recognition. For example, GAAP recognises provisions and 
government pensions earlier than National Accounts (ie 
National Accounts do not recognise pensions as early as 
FRS17), but single-use military equipment (SUME) later (ie 
expensed) than National Accounts (HM Treasury 2005b: 
paras 5.19–5.27). Other key differences are in the 
treatment of intra- and inter-entity transactions between 
parties in a group, which are only eliminated under a 
GAAP-based consolidation; and the use of market-based 
values to measure assets and liabilities for National 
Accounts, in contrast to the mixed historical cost/fair value 
approach under GAAP (see IFAC 2005 for more extensive 
discussions of these differences). Such differences in 
accounting can affect government financial planning. For 
example, HM Treasury (2005b) has claimed that the earlier 
recognition of liabilities under the GAAP-based WGA 
system has obligated the government to plan further 
ahead for their incurrence. HM Treasury (2005b) has also 
said, however, that decision making will improve at both 
the micro (individual) and macro (aggregated) level under 
a GAAP-based WGA system, because of the greater 
amount of data being collected from the accounts of 
individual public sector bodies. In particular, WGA was 
expected to allow for greater flexibility in configuring data 
for use by various decision makers and to reduce reliance 
on estimates by recording in greater detail individual 
transactions and the elimination of inter-entity 
transactions through line-by-line consolidation. 
Our interviews revealed mixed views in terms of the 
supposed benefits for economic policy making of a GAAP-
based WGA system. Few interviewees were able to provide 
specific examples of how the new information was being, 
or will be, used. Even HM Treasury staff who could provide 
such examples chose to emphasise the gradual and 
complex nature of the process of shifting to WGA. 
Because of the way [HM Treasury does] long-term 
projections, which is essentially just a very long-run 
discounted cash flow, this means that the provision itself 
is inadequate. You could use movements in the provision 
as some kind of fiscal indicator and that’s the way [the 
WGA team within HM Treasury] were talking 18 months–
two years ago and…in terms of using net liabilities or 
assets and WGA, that’s something that we would still do 
…The people who deal with that angle of fiscal policy are 
now saying, right, what we need to do between us is 
gather the information so that we can incorporate the 
future flows that are encapsulated in the provision into 
our long-term forecasts and we need to make sure that’s 
done on a basis which is consistent with the information 
you’re getting so that we can say to people, well yes 
there’s a £X (or whatever it is) nuclear decommissioning 
provision but actually that’s there in the long-term 
forecasts and it’s exactly comparable and if you do 
discount back the long-term forecast element of that, it 
does come to the £X you’ve got on the balance sheet…
We are starting to integrate, not by just grabbing a GAAP 
number and doing something with it but by actually 
trying intelligently to analyse it and look at what the 
implications are.
Many interviewees, while acknowledging that the collection 
of WGA information had created a greater awareness of 
the need to tighten financial reporting processes across 
the public sector, expressed their reservations over the 
probable usefulness of WGA for ministers and key 
government planners. For example, in response to a 
question on how HM Treasury would use WGA information, 
a Treasury official involved in the development of WGA 
suggested that, for the moment, only certain components 
would be useful for economic planning purposes.
Yes [WGA would be used, but] not the whole of WGA, as 
there isn’t a huge amount of interest in the fixed asset 
information. For the sort of things we do on fixed assets, 
WGA information doesn’t really help much. However, for 
certain parts of the WGA – accounting for pensions is the 
one that really stands out – it is useful. In addition, some 
of the stuff around financial assets and liabilities is 
starting to be connected because people are realising 
that [there is useful] information out there. 
In its defence, two interviewees within HM Treasury argued 
that the introduction of WGA had more to do with driving 
the broader accounting reform agenda across the public 
sector, although they also had some uncertainties in terms 
of user identification.
From my position…it is not clearly set out what the 
ultimate goal is or…who the end users are going to be. 
Now you would say Parliament would be a user but you’d 
have to explain it to them. Academics would be users and 
you also have the fiscal policy individuals [in HM Treasury] 
who would be users. How does it all fit in? That is one 
thing I can’t explain. One area that I can...is to do with the 
financial management aspect and here it is driving the 
whole financial management in the public sector, 
improving the quality and the timing, of the reporting. 
[WGA] has got people saying ‘oh WGA, why don’t we 
think about that bit on the budget…WGA is either 
precipitating [budgetary planning] or, in a lot of cases, 
just providing the focus for it. 
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For HM Treasury employees, one reason for the 
uncertainty surrounding the types of decision for which 
WGA is likely to be useful is that many potential users are 
confused about how WGA will differ from the information 
being provided by the statistics-based National Accounts. 
[On the question of whether I] envisage any teething 
issues from WGA reporting, I think one very big problem 
[HM Treasury has] will be to try and understand and 
interpret what the accounts say and to explain them to 
people...first of all [HM Treasury] need to understand the 
accounts themselves, because nobody’s ever seen 
anything like that produced from accounts, whereas the 
national statistics people that have done statistics for a 
long time...if there is a big difference between what the 
statistics say and what the GAAP-based accounts say and 
the interpretation...that’s definitely going to be an issue 
and the other one will be comparability both internally, in 
the accounts themselves, at least for the first few years, 
and also comparability to other accounts that are 
produced. 
In our interviews with the Audit Commission, one 
interviewee raised a concern over the usefulness of WGA 
for those identified audiences. 
The main users were anticipated to be within government 
itself, planners, economists within government, and also 
to some extent Parliament. Now, I am not sure that I 
remember seeing anybody out there saying that this 
[WGA] would be something the public would engage 
with. I think there is a big issue about whom this is for, 
really. You’ll be talking about such massive numbers that 
often people can’t relate to that number, I think. If you say 
that somebody’s lost £100,000, you can perhaps 
understand that. If you start talking about £5 billion, 
people can’t relate. 
Such concerns were also echoed in a relatively recent 
statement made by FRAB.
Whole of government accounts will be an important tool 
in helping to demonstrate the Government’s stewardship 
of the public finances. The Board welcomes the 
Treasury’s published explanations of how an accruals 
based balance sheet interacts with other forms of 
reporting, but considers that these publications have 
limited audiences. The Board urges the Treasury, 
therefore, to consider carefully how it will explain in plain 
English to the general users the meaning of the 
stewardship information in whole of government 
accounts. (FRAB 2006: para. 4.11)
In our subsequent interviews at HM Treasury,5 officials still 
stressed that the key users of WGA are itself and 
Parliament, and therefore the design of WGA would 
primarily take into account the needs of these two users. 
5. We have conducted a number of interviews at HM Treasury 
with various staff over a period of 18 months.
We have identified our key users as Parliament and the 
Treasury; The Treasury because the Treasury agrees 
budgets with departments so we want to know what 
departments have done with the budget, and Parliament 
for at least two reasons, probably three actually: First, 
because they [Parliament] are the proxy for the taxpayer, 
or the people whether they’re a taxpayer or not. So you 
want to be able to give them information to be able to 
understand what the government’s doing. Second, they 
want to scrutinise what governments are doing because 
they are the Parliament and that’s a parliament’s job, and 
third because, of course, they are the people that vote the 
estimates [ie granting parliamentary approval for a 
government’s budget] and so they want to know what 
departments have done with resources they’ve been 
voted. 
Nonetheless, there are also indications that HM Treasury is 
also now explicitly considering the needs of an individual 
public user in designing WGA for publication.
It would be interesting to know, or to think about what the 
[WGA] accounts ought to look like...In trying to make a 
balance sheet meaningful and relevant in terms of what 
‘Joe Public’ might understand, for example, should you try 
to present a balance sheet in such a way that your equity 
side is actually the national debt? Now, because people 
have heard about the national debt, and while they might 
not know exactly what it is, but if you [show how your 
assets and your liabilities relates to your national debt], 
it might help. 
Interviews with other organisations, such as the Audit 
Commission, the ONS and individual local governments, 
suggest that they see HM Treasury as the key beneficiary 
of the WGA project, but they remain unclear over how WGA 
can be used by themselves or others. 
WGA...can be seen to be used in a more general way. [If 
you think about it], who would use it? It could only really 
be the Treasury and the Chancellor for macroeconomic 
purposes. It may fulfil some broader function about 
statistical returns to Europe, or whatever it might be, but 
as a management tool, I can’t see it being that helpful. 
(Audit Commission)
It’s a very difficult question to answer [the question of 
who WGA users are]...perhaps you ought to ask 
Parliament because they passed the Government 
Resources and Accounts Act. (Office for National 
Statistics)
You only have your own information [from WGA 
submissions]. You can’t access information for other 
[local] authorities so you cannot compare other 
authorities with your information. The information is 
purely for the government’s purposes. You produce 
because they’ve asked for it and you don’t have any 
option. The benefit to the authorities would be negligible 
because there’s a cost attached to it. (Local Government 
Accounting Officer)
21WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING IN THE UK 4. ASSESSING THE UK WGA EXPERIENCE
Although it is clear that WGA has been premised on a 
supposed broad range of users and associated user-needs, 
such comments suggest that there has been little active 
involvement on the part of users in WGA policy 
development. This may help to explain the difficulties that 
interviewees have had in detailing specific instances where 
WGA information is likely to prove useful – making the 
difficulties in this respect of some HM Treasury officials 
significant, given the claims of others that HM Treasury is 
likely to be the central user of WGA. Weakly developed 
conceptions of the identity and information needs of users 
mirror the development of consolidated accounting in the 
private sector. Further, it has parallels with Young’s finding 
(2006) that much of the development of accounting 
standards in the private sector has occurred on the basis 
of general, ill-specified, references to ‘user needs’ or 
desires – and processes rarely involving any detailed study 
of the decision models employed by specific user groups. 
Young argues that individual users need to be more 
involved in the accounting standard setting process. 
That said, some reported experiences to date do suggest 
that WGA might have produced unexpected benefits to 
some ‘potential’ user groups. Specifically, it has been 
claimed that central government departments and local 
governments may well be experiencing an improvement in 
their decision-making processes – with WGA being said to 
provide incentives for more proactive balance sheet 
management and policy determination. For example, an 
interviewee from HM Treasury noticed that WGA sub-
consolidation exercises were getting central government 
departments to think more about their ‘group’ and 
associated identity, operating capacity and risk exposures.
That is partly about the departmental balance sheet, 
which is very much focused on the estimates boundary 
and doesn’t take in the group balance sheet...Getting [a 
central government department] to think about their 
group and the risks in their group is one of the things that 
came out of the financial management review and there 
is a link there to WGA in that...they are responsible for 
doing a sub-consolidation for WGA. The WGA sub-
consolidation is purely an administrative process, which 
does not get published. It is just that they know what is 
going on and that is where most of these group 
transactions are within that little family. So, WGA would 
get them to do the work, [which leads them to think] as 
a group and manage as a group. 
In local government, there was some reported evidence 
that WGA information has featured, or at least been 
considered, in aspects of policy making, despite the 
current lack of full convergence between local government 
and central government accounting standards. As another 
Treasury official commented:
[HM Treasury] has already used some WGA information 
in policy formulation...I happened to mention to the local 
government team that we...had some information and 
before we knew it, it was appearing in submissions to 
ministers...It was undoubtedly better than anything we’d 
had from local authorities before. I don’t think it’s going 
to seriously harm local government where they are on a 
different basis, I don’t think there’s any great push to use 
WGA numbers as the basis for distributing grants or 
anything like that...but actually people are sitting up and 
paying attention to the numbers. 
Although there is an indication that some governmental 
decision makers are able to use some of the information 
arising from WGA for policy purposes, neither the WGA 
scoping study nor our interviewees provided convincing 
support for the claims that a WGA, GAAP-based 
accounting system will result in more accurate and useful 
information than the existing ‘estimate’-based statistical, 
national accounting system. Doubts about the usefulness 
of WGA information for macroeconomic decision making 
are fuelled further when the government professes that 
WGA information will be only one of a number of indicators 
used for its long-term planning of public finances (HM 
Treasury 2005c; for further discussion, see Chow et al. 
2007). Indeed, some recent observations of WGA 
developments have suggested that changing from a 
‘National Accounts’ to a ‘GAAP’ basis of accounting is 
going to be rather more problematic than first anticipated, 
because the information it produces may not be politically 
expedient. For example, the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
has claimed that the result of such a move would triple the 
value of debt on the government’s balance sheet, the 
implication of which is that the government could never 
meet the debt ceiling imposed by its own fiscal rule (ie the 
sustainable investment rule) unless its debt ceiling were 
significantly raised in tandem with any such accounting 
changes (Treasury Committee 2006: para. 51). 
From an international learning perspective, it is worth 
emphasising that the twin problems of usability of WGA 
and the task of managing the changed basis of accounting 
for public sector finances were also observed in Australia 
and New Zealand. Given the similarity in the claims made 
for WGA, it is important to note that a survey of Australian 
WGA experiences revealed that it was only used for 
reporting purposes, not policy making (see HM Treasury 
1998c: 147). Additionally, the introduction of WGA in 
Australia is reported to have led to confusion over where 
the differences lie in the information presented by the 
existing Government Finance Statistics (GFS) accrual 
reports and the newer GAAP-based accrual reports. An 
Australian state treasury official in charge of preparing 
WGA made the following observation during an interview.
It is confusing at the moment because there are a 
number of different bases of preparing information out 
there which are similar in terminology and results. So for 
the uneducated user you really need to have a fairly 
strong understanding of government to pick which 
numbers are comparable. I think you also need to be able 
to actually get them in front of you and have a look at 
them because Joe Bloggs on the street is just going to 
get what is reported to him and he is just going to go ‘ah 
you have a surplus, that’s good’. 
An interviewee from the International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC) with experience of Australian WGA 
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developments amplified such points. 
In Australia...there were parliamentarians who were 
thoroughly confused by what appeared to be different 
outcomes [as a result of the publications of the financial 
reports on a GFS and GAAP basis] over the same time 
reference for reasons which seemed quite opaque. They 
wouldn’t have been opaque to people who’d been highly 
knowledgeable about both systems but to your average 
intelligent layman it was frustrating that two systems 
appeared to present such different outcomes. I think it 
enhances the standing of both communities if they are 
able to clearly identify and explain those differences. 
This issue of presenting public sector finances using two 
different sets of accounting standards (statistical and 
GAAP) was also raised by the Australian Accounting 
Standards Board (AASB) and it is currently trying to 
resolve the differences and consider ways in which to 
reconcile the statements where differences cannot be 
eliminated (see AASB 2007a; 2007b). At the international 
level, IFAC published a research report outlining various 
differences between the two approaches and what could 
be done to harmonise/minimise the impact of such 
differences (see IFAC 2005). HM Treasury is considering 
harmonising to enable GAAP data to be used in the 
preparation of National Accounts (HM Treasury 2005b: 
para. 5.28). Since public sector data for both statistical 
and GAAP reporting purposes often come from identical 
sources (eg a central/local government department 
supplying raw data), harmonisation is viewed as helping to 
improve the quality and consistency of the data-collection 
and processing process, undertaken in the UK through 
COINS (see HM Treasury 2005b: para. 5.11). This 
harmonisation process is, however, set to be complicated 
by the changing of the statistical basis for both the UK’s 
National Accounts (ESA95) and the current UK GAAP, from 
2008 onwards – with the government obligated to 
adopting the forthcoming SNA20086 and IFRS (FRAB 
2007b) respectively.
Regarding the New Zealand experience with WGA, the 
general consensus (eg Newberry and Pallot 2005; Norman 
1997; Pallot 2001) is that there have been improvements 
in the amount and detail of information available to users 
– but there remains a lack of clarity over the intended 
users of WGA statements, and an inability to attribute 
improved decision making in government to WGA (see 
HM Treasury 1998c: 147). 
In summary, evidence on the usefulness of WGA for 
decision making is mixed. Although it is recognised that 
WGA has not yet been published in the UK, some 
interviewees have noted that the information being 
collected for WGA purposes has started to feature in the 
decisions of local government and HM Treasury. Other 
interviewees were more circumspect, however, expressing 
6. For updates on the revision of the System of National 
Accounts (SNA), see the United Nations’ Inter-secretariat Working 
Group on National Accounts (ISWGNA) website (UN 2008).
their doubts over the claims made for the usefulness of 
WGA given poorly defined user groups and needs. 
Furthermore, a key aspect of the usability of WGA 
information is linked to the accounting system on which it 
is based and the extent to which confusion will be caused 
by the continued production of accounts on a statistical 
basis.
improvinG AccoUntAbility throUGh better 
finAnciAl reportinG 
Another key claim for WGA is that it will provide a better 
overall picture of government finances by bringing 
together all the assets and liabilities that it controls (HM 
Treasury 1998c: para. 2.17). This sub-section considers 
this claim by reviewing the way in which assets are valued 
in the public sector and the nature of debates over the 
definition and reporting of governmental debt.
issues of consistency in public sector asset accounting 
While delivering improvements in the processing of 
accounting information, the British government has 
experienced problems ensuring the consistent application 
of GAAP between central and local government.7 These 
problems can be traced in part to the additional legislative 
and political controls on local government, such as the 
latter’s lack of freedom to determine its own financial 
policies. As one HM Treasury interviewee emphasised:
The area that gives rise to a number of headaches are 
[sic] the differences between central and local 
government and in particular local government. A lot of 
their accounting is not UK accounts-based, it’s more 
legislative, it’s driven by legislation and it’s driven by 
millions of controls that were in place from local 
authorities which had nothing to do with accounting. 
A significant area of divergence is the classification of roads 
by central and local governments (FRAB 2006: paras. 
1.10–1.17). Currently, local governments record roads and 
other infrastructure assets at historical cost, whereas 
central government records them at current cost. The 
concern, expressed by some interviewees, is that if roads 
were reported on the balance sheet of local governments 
at current cost, this could lead to the impression that local 
government assets consist largely of roads. An interviewee 
close to the Audit Commission explained: 
You have got different ways of measuring assets, so you 
might have billions reflected through central government 
for things like roads, but you have nothing for local 
government. Yet that isn’t the case. One of the reasons 
local government decided to not to value roads [at 
current cost] is because it would make it look as if there 
were nothing else apart from roads that were valued, 
because they have so many roads.
7. The need to comply with IFRS, as stipulated by the 2007 
Budget, might throw up further problems of accounting policy 
alignment.
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Such concerns with adopting a current-cost basis of 
accounting have also been evident in debates over the 
valuation of heritage assets. Carnegie and West (2005) 
and Hooper et al. (2005), for instance, argue that as 
governments cannot take advantage of any increases in 
the value of heritage assets (as there are often covenants 
on its sale), a fair value approach is an inappropriate 
method of valuation. CIPFA/LASAAC (Local Authority 
(Scotland) Accounts Advisory Committee) claim to have 
addressed issues concerning the departure of local 
government accounting standards (SoRP) from UK GAAP 
(CIPFA/LASAAC 2007). The case of roads and other 
infrastructure assets suggests, however, that some 
departures are still problematic, with the C&AG (2007: 
para. 3.13) highlighting the divergent accounting treatment 
of roads as a significant issue requiring resolution. 
International experiences suggest that such valuation 
issues are difficult and time-consuming to resolve. In 
Australia, provisional arrangements for the recording of 
‘land under roads’ in Australian Accounting Standard 
(AAS) 31 ‘Financial Reporting by Government’, allowed 
entities unable to measure reliably the value of land under 
roads to refer to such assets in the notes to the accounts 
rather than including them on a WGA balance sheet. A 
time limit was set for this exemption, although this has 
been extended from 1996 up to December 2006, owing to 
pressure from the entities concerned, the asserted 
difficulties and scale of issues faced in valuing land under 
roads (although the official communication by the AASB 
does not say what these issues are), and a stated lack of 
‘international convergence’ or agreement on whether land 
under roads should be valued (see AASB 2006). This issue 
still remains unresolved despite the lapse of the December 
2006 deadline, with transitional arrangements being 
extended (see the proposed standard AASB 10XY on 
dealing with land under roads in AASB 2007a: 5). 
In the UK, the problems arising from the inconsistencies in 
accounting policy could, in part, be attributed to the 
divergent approaches taken by the UK’s various public and 
private sector professional accounting bodies. Ellwood and 
Newberry (2007: 558–9) show that while the ASB had 
rejected the matching concept (and by implication, current 
cost valuations), other public sector accountants (notably 
HM Treasury for central government) had retained and 
adopted current cost valuations. Such issues are 
significant, as UK government officials have traditionally 
emphasised the importance of WGA in engendering an 
inclusive and more consistent form of accounting, with 
desired knock-on benefits for processes of asset 
management not only within central government, but also 
across the public sector. As Paul Boateng made clear when 
he was Chief Secretary to HM Treasury: ‘Including public 
sector bodies beyond central government is essential to 
achieving the full benefits from WGA. In particular, it will 
improve the overall management of essential public assets 
such as schools, roads and hospitals’ (HM Treasury 2003).
defining the scope of WGA – the consolidation boundary 
and governmental liabilities 
Another accounting dimension that has proved 
problematic in the UK has been the WGA consolidation 
boundary. According to IAS 27, para. 4 (IASB 2003), 
control is defined as ‘the power to govern the financial and 
operating policies of an enterprise so as to obtain benefits 
from its activities’. The government has faced pressures to 
account for the liabilities of former public sector 
companies that are now privatised but that still have a 
government guarantee to maintain their existence. In the 
case of Network Rail, HM Treasury has argued that the 
C&AG’s interpretation of control is problematic and 
emphasised that the government does not have 
operational control over Network Rail. On this basis, it 
concluded that Network Rail should not be consolidated.8 
In relation to local government, HM Treasury (2005b: para 
5.5) has argued that it should be consolidated because a 
large proportion of its assets are funded by central 
government. To do otherwise would mean that central 
government accounts would record a large outflow, with no 
corresponding asset appearing on its balance sheet. HM 
Treasury (2005b: para 5.5) has argued that local 
government accounts should be consolidated because a 
large proportion of local government assets are funded by 
central government. Such consolidation is not 
unproblematic, however, as (under IAS 27) it implies 
central government control of local government, and 
thereby appears to conflict with the settled understanding 
of the separate roles and responsibilities of central and 
local government as set out in legislation.9
Alternatively, if it is acknowledged that all tiers of 
government are providing public services, then there are 
grounds for suggesting that a consolidated accounting 
view of the provision of such services should include all 
such tiers – and the various organisations providing such 
services through Private Finance Initiative (PFI) schemes. 
In relation to such schemes, however, HM Treasury has 
steadfastly refused to accept that the government controls 
the private companies running these schemes, despite the 
annual insistence of the NAO since 2001 that they should 
have been included on the government’s balance sheet 
8. An interviewee from the Office for National Statistics, with a 
detailed involvement in the Network Rail debates, supported such 
a view. This interviewee argued that Network Rail should not be 
consolidated, because HM Treasury does not have the power to 
dictate policies across the group that is being consolidated.
9. Although questions can be raised over the extent of any 
claimed local government independence given its high financial 
dependence on central government. Indeed, the constitutional 
implications for local government of WGA reforms have already 
been raised in countries such as New Zealand (Newberry and 
Pallot 2006).
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(see C&AG 2007: paras 3.22 and 3.27).10 The scale of 
‘debt’ being assumed under PFI schemes continues to be 
a central concern for those involved in WGA 
implementation, with the C&AG in 2006 stating that the 
WGA accounts are likely to be qualified owing to the high 
level of off-balance sheet financing by the government 
(including PFI projects for both the health and local 
government sectors, as quoted in Treasury Committee 
2006: para. 48). The C&AG has argued that the risks 
associated with such projects are not fully transferred to 
private sector bodies and thus the government should 
record the expenditure commitments as part of its (longer-
term) debts in the balance sheet. HM Treasury has 
responded that this is unrealistic and emphasised that any 
such qualifications would not significantly affect the WGA 
development, as individual accounts are qualified on a 
frequent basis anyway (Treasury Committee 2006: para. 
48; see also C&AG 2006: paras 3.62–3.64). 
To reconcile these differences, the C&AG (2007: para. 
3.27) has stated that a joint committee, comprising HM 
Treasury, the NAO and the Audit Commission along with 
major private sector accounting firms, will work towards an 
agreement on amending/withdrawing HM Treasury’s own 
interpretation of PFI accounting that allowed some PFI 
bodies within local government and the NHS to be 
classified off-balance sheet (HM Treasury 1998b). FRAB 
has called for the government to consider changing the 
criterion for classifying PFI on the government’s balance 
sheet, from one based on an assessment of risk and 
rewards to one based on control, whereby a body has to 
include the PFI infrastructure on balance sheet if it is 
deemed to control it, under the proposed IFRIC 12 (FRAB 
2007a: para. 2.13).
Ellwood and Newberry (2007: 566, para. 1) note that the 
Code for Fiscal Stability ‘does not take into account the 
impact of finance leases on public sector net debt as the 
impact cannot be accurately estimated [by the 
government]’. Significantly, such levels of uncertainty do 
appear to be having some influence on the probable use of 
WGA-related data. As noted earlier, Gordon Brown, then 
Chancellor of the Exchequer (now Prime Minister), implied 
in 2006 (see Treasury Committee 2006: para. 51) that the 
figures produced using WGA would not feature in certain 
key governmental economic policies, such as the 
sustainable investment rule (one of the components in the 
Code for Fiscal Stability) without further review of the fiscal 
limits imposed by the rule. This was despite claims made 
in earlier HM Treasury publications that WGA would help 
underpin the Code for Fiscal Stability. 
10. Academic analyses on this topic tend to be supportive of the 
stance taken by the NAO. For example, Hodges and Mellett (2004, 
2005) conclude that PFI projects are effectively long-term lease 
financing schemes from which the government cannot extricate 
itself without suffering punitive costs and, thus, are required to be 
shown on the balance sheet. Froud (2003) argues that PFI 
projects could not fully transfer all risks from the public to the 
private sector without limiting the ability of the public sector to 
respond to unanticipated events.
learning from previous experiences?
The accounting problems and definitional issues discussed 
in this report are not unique to the UK. Both Australia and 
New Zealand reported experiences of similar problems. 
For instance, in New Zealand, the Treasury had to counter 
concerns that the claimed accuracy and usefulness of the 
Crown financial statements would be undermined by 
accounting difficulties encountered in the valuation of 
infrastructure, community and heritage assets and with 
the valuation of liabilities such as pensions (see Pallot 
1994, 2001). Pallot (2001) notes that managers had not 
consistently recorded the procedures or methods used in 
valuing their assets and liabilities – leading the NZ Audit 
Office to insist that departments develop appropriate 
systems and prepare reports that gave full disclosure of 
any problematic areas to Parliament. 
In Australia, the debate over the recording of government 
assets such as heritage, cultural and community assets 
has focused on the appropriateness of the asset definition, 
whether such assets can be accurately valued, what 
valuation basis is appropriate, and what benefit this 
information is likely to provide (eg Carnegie and West 
2003, 2005; Carnegie and Wolnizer 1995, 1997; Hooper et 
al. 2005). Recently, Wise (2006) undertook a review of 
(Australian) WGA reports for the 1999/2000 and 2003/4 
financial years with a view to understanding valuation 
issues concerning WGA, and found that there were 
significant inconsistencies and omissions in the reporting 
of public assets and obligations on the WGA balance sheet. 
Some critics argue that many public assets are not only 
unlikely to have a market value but are also unlikely ever to 
be sold off – suggesting that any estimated market 
valuations are going to have little informational value to a 
user. Others claim that the cost of valuing such assets is 
likely to be exorbitant and well in excess of the benefits 
gained by valuation/balance sheet inclusion (see Wise 2006). 
Advocates of WGA, however, suggest that putting such assets 
in the balance sheet helps to ensure that managers are kept 
accountable for their maintenance – with their main concern 
being to develop a more consistent and conceptually 
defensible approach to valuation (see Hone 1997). 
One of the most debated and controversial issues 
surrounding the preparation of WGA in Australia and New 
Zealand has been over definitions of control – especially 
regarding whether bodies such as universities, charities, 
schools and hospitals should be included in WGA 
consolidations (see Miley 1999; Miley and Read 2000; Wise 
2006). Discussions have concerned whether any such inclusion 
should be based on the degree of funding provided by the 
national or federal government or whether more specific 
reference needs to be given to the legislation governing 
such institutions (in order to judge the level and nature of 
governmental control and the material impact of not 
including any such entities in the consolidation process: 
see Barrett 2001). In New Zealand, attempts have been 
made to eliminate any confusion over the boundaries of 
the Crown entity by amending the definitions to include ’all 
property over which the Crown (central government) holds 
ownership rights’ (Pallot 1994). This has been interpreted 
to include sub-entities and other items relating to the 
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Crown, including departments, Office of Parliament, 
state-owned enterprises, Crown entities, Ministers of the 
Crown, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Government Super 
Fund, and the New Zealand Super Fund (New Zealand 
Treasury 2007). 
In summary, this sub-section has considered claims that 
the production of WGA will improve government 
accountability through enhanced accounting transparency, 
and has identified three key problem areas. These are the 
consistency of accounting standards used across the 
public sector, definitions of control, and the scale of the 
consolidation boundary – with experiences in the UK, 
Australia and New Zealand having shown that such issues 
have proved difficult to resolve in practice, with direct 
implications for achieved levels of transparency.
improvinG finAnciAl mAnAGement Across the 
pUblic sector
A third key claim for WGA is that it will improve the quality 
of public sector financial management. This has been 
something of a problematic matter in that the capacity for 
the highly aggregated information produced by WGA to be 
used at a departmental or individual organisational level is 
clearly limited. That said, various interviewees spoke of 
WGA as having proved to be a useful vehicle for reinforcing 
a series of related accounting reforms, including the 
National Asset Register (HM Treasury 2007b), the 
Combined Online Information System (COINS) and RAB – 
although, in itself, it did not necessarily provide additional 
useful information benefits for government departments:
WGA tends to be a Trojan horse for getting things 
changed...the emphasis is on good financial management 
[from which] good financial reporting follows and good 
accountability follows. (HM Treasury interviewee)
I don’t see WGA itself being a particularly helpful thing. 
But to get to WGA, you have to have RAB produced on an 
absolutely correct basis, and so that is the benefit of it. 
(Audit Commission interviewee)
The financial management reviews are beyond the WGA 
programme...But if you see it from the [perspective of 
the Head of the Government Accountancy Service], it is 
all her problem and she sees it as one project or 
programme. That is exactly what we are trying to get 
people to do, which is to improve their cash flow 
management as part of their financial management but in 
an individual body balance sheet management context. In 
addition, they also need to think about the non-financial 
risks and join the financial management reporting up with 
non-financial management.… One of the things that WGA 
is making the departments do is to get creditors’ and 
debtors’ records correct. They never bothered before, 
even once RAB was up and running. But, they can’t do 
[prepare accounts] without having a proper creditors’ 
and debtors’ ledger. (HM Treasury interviewee)
In addition to improving government financial reporting 
and management, interviewees expected that WGA would 
improve the comparability of public entities through the 
centralisation/harmonisation of accounting functions. 
[COINS and the agenda to investigate convergence 
between GAAP and National Accounts is] probably one 
of the driving factors behind the WGA, and there is quite 
a lot more close work between ONS and the Treasury in 
terms of data exchange and revision. (HM Treasury 
interviewee) 
Now, of course, WGA is in a sense a convenient big driver 
in [pushing for bodies to harmonise their reporting 
dates], because if WGA is to be prepared, it can only be 
prepared on the underlying resource accounts of the 
ODPM and the Department of Health. In turn, they have 
to rely on every local authority and trust. So, that is quite 
a big driver, actually. (Audit Commission interviewee) 
Some local government interviewees also suggested that 
WGA is improving the financial communications between 
local government and central government (including 
processes of recognising and measuring inter-entity 
transactions). 
[Producing WGA] is a bit of a task. However, we do see at 
least some spin-off benefits here. One of the things that 
we’re being positive about is actually ensuring that we do 
have that central capacity whilst at the same time 
ensuring that...[we link] what we do in here to what 
happens out there in departments. It is about getting the 
balance right; the thing we were really interested in was 
WGA and our accounts. We have become quite alienated 
from out there but likewise we know that, [we must] 
make sure we can do the accounts, make sure that they 
are done properly, and make sure they link in with the 
returns. We do see them at the heart of good governance 
throughout the council. If you get those basic building 
blocks in place...you have a sound basis to build on, 
otherwise you can build up all these information flows but 
unless, at the end of the day, your accounting is sound, 
you fall apart. 
This centralising tendency with respect to accounting 
information is not without risk. For example, there are 
those (eg see Jones 2003) who have argued that, 
conceptually, governmental budgeting and (statistically 
based) national accounting systems are underpinned with 
fundamentally different user perspectives from those of 
external financial reporting and accountability systems. 
Such differences in perspectives represent a key reason 
for the divergence in the traditions and methods of 
accounting across such systems and represent a 
significant challenge for the UK government to overcome 
with reconciliation and integrating projects such as COINS. 
In addition to these conceptual differences, there are also 
concerns about the ability of consolidated bodies to 
provide the data within the required timescales. For 
example, the C&AG (2006: para. 1.9; 2007: para. 3.7) has 
reported that, despite the significant advances made, the 
government has still yet to achieve the prerequisite 
standards. Issues identified by the C&AG (2006: para. 
1.94) include: 
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poor timeliness, whereby too many bodies still fail to •	
submit their accounts to HM Treasury on time
continuing problems in eliminating inter-entity •	
transactions
incomplete information on some pension schemes, •	
leading to concerns about the accuracy of reporting 
with regard to pension liabilities.
The elimination of inter-entity transactions has proved to 
be a continuing problem, not just in the UK, but also in 
countries with more experience of WGA reforms, such as 
Australia and New Zealand (see Barrett 2001; Miley 1999). 
Barrett (1997) notes that during the development of WGA 
in Australia, many of the agencies being consolidated were 
not operating with systems that were designed to collect 
such information – partial recording of the initial transaction 
made any elimination process essentially problematic. 
On a more positive note, in interview, some UK local 
government officials did suggest that the process of 
implementing WGA reforms has provided the impetus (if 
not the incentives) for timelier reporting. In this respect, 
the harmonisation of reporting dates was seen to be 
central to any improvements in the comparability of 
information and the ability to benchmark. While it is too 
early to draw conclusions as to whether other 
organisations across the public sector will reap similar 
benefits, such interviewees were certainly encouraged by 
their experiences to date. 
There have been some real benefits in terms of providing 
a bit of a focus. It’s fair to say that in local government, 
on the finance side, the budget has always had a greater 
focus and the actual accounts have been seen as a very 
technical exercise. What we have now seen [with WGA] is 
a greater focus on that process, particularly in terms of 
speeding [the reporting] up. At the very least that is then 
released resources so we’re not spending all of our time...
so we’ve had resource gained in terms of being able to 
put resources into other areas, which has been helpful. 
In summary, WGA is represented as an instrument for 
improving financial management across the public sector. 
It is encouraging a gradual centralisation of public sector 
accounting information, through the harmonisation of 
accounting standards and the process of establishing a 
unified accounting system for public sector data (eg 
COINS). The experience to date in implementing and using 
WGA information, however, is rather mixed; some users are 
finding the impetus for accounting information useful, 
while others are still struggling with the consolidation 
process or with the transition process between cash-based 
and accruals-based accounting. While the C&AG (2008: 
para. 14) recently concluded that ‘good progress continues 
to be made on what is a challenging and significant 
project’, there also appear to be grounds for arguing that 
for some public bodies, WGA has been about getting them 
to improve their basic accounting recording and reporting 
practices. Indeed, the C&AG (2008: para. 3.4) report gives 
a clear indication of this when noting that the key issues 
on which the Treasury and the NAO are continuing to work 
together include the number of bodies that are: ‘failing to 
deliver within the accelerating timeframes set by the 
Treasury; having difficulty in identifying transactions and 
balances for elimination with other government bodies, 
distorting the overall picture of government finances; and 
submitting consolidation returns of poor quality, reflecting 
lack of appropriate supervision, appropriate resources, and 
prioritisation of the consolidation process’.
Furthermore, despite having completed two stages of the 
WGA development timetable, no WGA financial statements 
or supporting data have been published, with the period of 
delay for publication of full WGA now amounting to four 
years. The C&AG (2008) confirmed that the first full WGA 
dry run consolidation and dry run audit procedures were 
completed for the 2005/06 financial year but the lack of 
publication is something over which FRAB has regularly 
expressed its disappointment (see FRAB 2006: para. 1.17; 
FRAB 2007a: para. 3.32). 
section sUmmAry
The development of WGA was premised on three key 
claims – namely, that it would aid governmental economic 
policy making, enhance governmental accountability to 
Parliament, and improve public sector financial 
management. On the first claim of aiding economic policy 
making, there exist some significant doubts as to the 
adequacy of consolidated accrual-based financial 
accounts, both from a historical perspective and from the 
perceived practical value of WGA reports currently being 
constructed. In relation to the second claim of improving 
accountability and the pursuit of better governmental 
financial reporting, difficulties have been experienced over 
the lack of harmonisation between GAAP-based and 
statistically based accounting standards/systems and 
debates/disputes over the valuation bases for assets and 
liabilities, definitions of governmental control and the scale 
of the consolidation boundary. With regard to the third 
claim of improving public sector financial management, 
the main impact of WGA appears to have been not from 
the use of any WGA information, but rather from the 
disciplining powers of such a development in terms of 
stimulating individual government departments to improve 
or align their internal accounting systems with the 
requirements of the WGA data-collection and reporting 
systems. A number of the issues to arise while developing 
and implementing WGA in the UK have also surfaced in 
countries more advanced with WGA reforms, such as 
Australia and New Zealand. Some issues still remain 
problematic in these countries, but they are both able to 
publish WGA information on a routine basis. The scale of 
the consolidation being undertaken in the UK is, however, 
much larger and more complex than anything attempted 
in either New Zealand or Australia. The UK has yet to 
publish its first set of WGA financial statements, so 
questions still remain about the extent to which, for a 
governmental consolidation of this scale and detail, the 
problems and issues raised in the above analysis are 
‘surmountable’ (as claimed by the government’s initial 
scoping study for WGA; see HM Treasury 1998c: 3).
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This report contributes to our understanding of WGA by 
providing a detailed account of the UK government’s 
development, to date, of WGA and an assessment of the 
extent to which the claims made for it are being met. The 
issues discussed in this report provide useful historical 
reflections on the move to consolidated financial reporting 
in the UK public sector. Historical analysis and contextual 
considerations are important for gaining an informed, 
broad-based understanding of the nature of such accounting 
systems and their capacity to deliver improved macroeconomic 
decision making, governmental accountability and 
financial management. Although the UK has yet to produce 
a first completed set of WGA accounts, and regularly 
adjusted/extended planned reporting timetables, the 
experiences with WGA to date give important insights on 
the practical opportunities available to, and the hurdles 
and constraints confronting, those charged with the task of 
implementing accounting change in the public sector. 
For all the grand claims that have been (and continue to 
be) made about WGA, its practical usefulness does appear 
to be falling somewhat short, although this may change 
once it is fully operational. WGA’s presumed capacity to 
improve economic decision making has been the main 
benefit claimed for it, yet at present it looks set to play a 
mainly catalytic role, stimulating improvements in 
accounting systems within departments, and, it is hoped, 
triggering higher standards of public sector financial 
management. Nonetheless, the lack of a clearly defined 
user for, and use of, WGA, has worried public sector 
watchdogs such as FRAB, particularly given parliamentary 
expectations of WGA. Further, government planners and 
others said to benefit from WGA have had little direct 
involvement in its development. 
From a logistical standpoint, it is clear that the government 
has struggled to deliver WGA within the timeframes set, 
despite claims that such problems are surmountable. This 
will have had implications for the costs of the WGA project, 
although it is difficult to determine the extent of such 
expenditure. No such financial data are publicly available, 
nor has it proved possible to identify and/or access the 
more detailed estimates recommended in the scoping 
study. In practice the position is further complicated by 
the fact that HM Treasury staff working on WGA have also 
been involved in other activities, while IT expenditure 
similarly has been directed at a number of strategic 
priorities in the recording of financial data and not just at 
the consolidation exercise. Within the Treasury, the scale of 
WGA has also not been such as to warrant its being 
treated as a separate cost centre. Collectively, such a state 
of affairs could be seen as indicative of the privileged 
status often assigned to public sector financial 
management reforms in that they are not subjected to as 
strict a set of VFM tests and evaluations as are said to be 
applied to other public services (see Humphrey et al. 
1993). Alternatively, it could be indicative of a project that 
has not proved to be as successful as the claims made for 
it or that has lost momentum in the face of significant 
operational problems and competing organisational 
priorities. Overall, and in light of the information in the 
public domain, it remains something of an open question 
whether the government has allocated sufficient resources 
to the task or whether the exercise (of consolidating more 
than a thousand bodies under WGA and implementing 
accruals accounting and budgeting across central 
government only a few years before WGA’s launch) has just 
been too big – and whether it would have been more 
sensible to secure a fully operational form of CGA before 
embarking on the wider WGA project. The longer the 
delays in publication of WGA financial statements, the 
more it is likely to be argued that the problems encountered 
are fundamental ones, rather than initial teething troubles 
or resource issues. Debates to date over the WGA 
boundary definitions, notions of control and the inclusion 
of various assets and liabilities, coupled with problems 
over the elimination of inter-entity balances and data-
collection processes, certainly suggest that the practice of 
WGA will be more complex and problematic than indicated 
in the reports advocating its benefits and potential. 
Debates over asset and liability classifications might look 
theoretical but the amounts concerned are material and, in 
certain cases, will significantly raise the level of reported 
governmental debt on the WGA balance sheet. More 
generally, the findings reported here point to the need for 
more investigation of, and learning from, the experiences 
of other countries that have implemented, or are seeking 
to implement, WGA systems. In this respect, it is noticeable 
that that the UK government has struggled with WGA 
issues that have also proved problematic in both Australia 
and New Zealand – for example, concerning the nature of 
the consolidation boundary, the scale of inter-entity 
transactions and the valuation and ownership of certain 
public sector assets and liabilities. 
Although the UK did commit to a staged development 
process with WGA, it may well be that a more experimental 
implementation approach (with more limited system 
developments and evident, published, completion of one 
stage before advancement to the next stage of 
development) will prove to be a more appropriate best-
practice norm than the path followed by the UK 
government. (For a discussion on the benefits of 
experimentation prior to committing to a new accounting 
system rather than experimenting as part of the 
implementation process, see Lüder and Jones 2003). 
Wildavsky (1973) cites the ‘rule of the mounting mirage’, 
whereby the promises of a reform programme become 
ever grander to counter the disappointment and 
demoralisation of experienced failures and unrealised 
expectations. While the WGA experience certainly started 
with grand claims, it would appear that expectations over 
time have been somewhat toned down – and that some 
experienced benefits have been rather more unintended 
than planned, in the sense that WGA has acted as a 
catalyst or a discipline for delivering improved accounting 
systems within government departments. In this respect, it 
looks fair to say that the WGA development process has 
been helped rather more by the securing of (small) 
practical achievements than the building up of grand, 
anticipated claims – although such claims clearly helped in 
the initial go-ahead for the reform programme. A firmer 
evaluation of the overall merits and ‘value-for-money’ of 
WGA awaits its publication and practical establishment as 
a regular system of government reporting. If, in this sense, 
the jury is still out on the value of WGA, it is also fair to say, 
on the basis of the evidence presented here, that the case 
for the defence (ie for advocates of WGA) is in need of 
further evidence demonstrating substantive and 
substantial operational impacts. 
5. summary and concluding remarks
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